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 Introduction	
In	1949,	the	Chinese	Nationalist	Party/Kuomintang	(KMT),	fled	to	the	island	of	
Taiwan	and	established	the	Republic	of	China	on	Taiwan	(ROC/Taiwan)	after	suffering	a	
crushing	defeat	on	mainland	China	at	the	hands	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party.	In	1981,	
the	Communist	Party,	having	formed	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(PRC)	in	1949,	reached	
out	to	Taiwan	with	a	proposal	for	reunification.	“One	country,	two	systems”	was	rejected	
by	the	Taiwanese	then,	and	the	government	has	continued	to	refuse	unification	under	that	
model.	Failing	with	one	region,	the	PRC	turned	their	attention	to	Hong	Kong	and	Macau.	
For	almost	all	the	20th	century,	Hong	Kong	and	Macau	had	been	under	the	control	of	the	
British	and	Portuguese	Empires,	and	by	the	end	of	the	century,	the	PRC	were	pursuing	a	
policy	of	complete	unification.	The	goal	of	the	PRC	was	to	return	all	land	that	was	formerly	
under	China’s	control	back	to	China.	The	failure	with	Taiwan	did	not	discourage	the	PRC	
from	pursuing	unification	under	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	model,	however.	Instead,	
they	took	that	idea	and	applied	it	to	Hong	Kong	and	Macau,	with	retrocession	of	the	two	
territories	occurring	in	1997	and	1999.	
In	the	years	following	unification,	many	scholars	have	examined	the	nature	of	“one	
country,	two	systems,”	and	what	it	means.	The	model	was	representative	of	a	new	form	of	
governance	that	the	rest	of	the	world	was	not	familiar	with.	Though	it	vaguely	resembled	
the	colonial	system	of	the	past,	with	a	semi-autonomous	region	being	overseen	by	a	larger	
power,	the	model	was	ultimately	different.	The	model	implemented	in	Hong	Kong	showed	a	
system	in	which	a	territory	was	meant	to	function	independently	and	be	self-sufficient.	
Additionally,	the	Basic	Law	designed	for	Hong	Kong	allowed	for	the	formation	of	a	semi-
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democratic	system	to	govern	the	territory,	completely	different	from	the	authoritarian	
political	system	of	mainland	China.	
Many	scholars	have	asked	what	this	system	is,	what	it	has	meant	for	Hong	Kong,	
what	it	means	for	Taiwan,	and	more	importantly,	what	it	means	for	the	broader	
international	community.	“One	country,	two	systems”	represents	an	idea	of	a	
hybrid/shared	sovereignty,	where	the	PRC	is	the	“sole	representative”	of	China	in	
international	organizations	and	the	general	global	community,	yet	Hong	Kong,	as	a	global	
city	and	economic	center,	holds	a	separate	seat	in	various	international	organizations	and	
has	its	own	currency,	independent	judiciary,	and	citizenship	documents.	What	does	hybrid	
sovereignty	mean?	How	can	a	sovereign	country	function	with	shared	sovereignty	between	
more	than	one	political	institution	in	that	country?	Though	the	United	States	of	America	
has	multiple	states,	all	ultimately	subservient	to	the	federal	government,	those	states	do	
not	have	seats	in	international	organizations	like	Hong	Kong	does.	How	does	this	country	
function	when	one	body	is	recognized	as	the	sole	legal	representative,	but	is	clearly	not	the	
sole	international	representative	of	that	country?	What	does	this	mean	for	the	future	of	
regional	disputes,	like	we	have	seen	in	the	Korean	Peninsula,	or	(and	this	is	rather	
different)	the	Arab-Israeli	conflict	in	the	Middle	East?	If	China’s	model	of	unification	works,	
then	a	system	of	shared	sovereignty	may	be	applicable	to	other	conflicts	that	are	still	
struggling	to	find	an	answer.	All	these	questions,	and	many	more	come	from	discussions	on	
the	status	quo	between	Hong	Kong	and	China,	but	the	most	intriguing	question	to	me	
concerns	why	Taiwan	has	never	accepted	the	model,	even	as	a	beginning	for	negotiations,	
and	how	the	model	would	work	in	Taiwan	–	could	it	ever	work	for	Taiwan.	Taiwan	has	
developed	very	differently	from	Hong	Kong,	perhaps	most	importantly	because	of	its	
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political	independence	in	the	post-World	War	II	era	and	subsequent	development	of	a	
strong	democratic	political	system.	
In	exploring	the	model,	and	understanding	“hybrid	sovereignty,”	we	must	first	
understand	sovereignty	itself.	In	his	book	Sovereignty:	Organized	Hypocrisy,	Stephen	D.	
Krasner,	a	professor	of	international	relations	at	Stanford	University	and	former	Director	of	
Policy	Planning	in	the	US	Department	of	State,	uses	his	opening	chapter,	“Sovereignty	and	
Its	Discontents,”	to	explain	his	framework	for	sovereignty.	Krasner	begins	by	explaining	the	
general	analytical	views	of	sovereignty	held	by	international	relations	scholars.	He	suggests	
that	the	argument	is	either	that	“sovereignty	is	being	eroded	by…globalization	[or]	that	it	is	
being	sustained…”1	He	makes	the	point,	however,	that	the	term	itself	has	been	used	in	
different	ways	by	scholars	from	different	fields.	His	chapter,	“Problematic	Sovereignty,”	in	
the	similarly	titled	book	he	edited,	describes	these	different	views.	For	some	sociological-
minded	scholars,	sovereignty	is	essentially	a	script	facilitating	outcomes.	To	international	
legal	scholars,	sovereignty	applies	to	states	in	the	sense	that	a	sovereign	state	has	its	own	
jurisdiction	and	can	enter	into	treaties	promoting	their	self-defined	interests.	For	the	
political	science	scholars,	Krasner	separates	them	into	two	distinct	groups.	One	side	he	
describes	sovereignty	as	an	analytical	assumption	“where	states	are	assumed	to	be	
rational,	unitary,	and	independent	actors.”2	In	other	words,	these	scholars	view	sovereignty	
as	something	inherent	and	assumed	in	the	system.	For	the	other	political	science	scholars,	
“sovereignty	is	a	set	of	normative	principles	into	which	statesmen	are	socialized,	the	most	
 
1	Stephen	D.	Krasner,	Sovereignty:	Organized	Hypocrisy	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1999),	3.	
2	Stephen	D.	Krasner,	“Problematic	Sovereignty,”	in	Problematic	Sovereignty:	Contested	Rules	and	Political	
Possibilities,	ed.	Stephen	Krasner	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2001),	1.	
4	
	
important	of	which	is	nonintervention	in	the	internal	affairs	of	other	states.”3	All	these	
forms	of	sovereignty	generally	have	ties	to	the	international	community,	and	relationships	
between	states	[political	institutions].	Krasner	considers	all	the	definitions	he	notes	in	
creating	his	framework.	He	describes	the	various	ways	sovereignty	has	been	used	as	a	term	
as	international	legal	sovereignty,	Westphalian	sovereignty,	domestic	sovereignty,	and	
interdependence	sovereignty.	
International	legal	sovereignty	largely	concerns	the	international	community,	as	it	
refers	to	“the	practices	associated	with	mutual	recognition,	usually	between	territorial	
entities	that	have	formal	juridical	interdependence.”4	The	formal	recognition	is	often	
dependent	on	international	organizations,	like	the	United	Nations.	As	Krasner	notes,	most	
governments	seek	international	legal	sovereignty	because	it	provides	access	to	
international	resources.	With	recognition	comes	the	ability	to	form	alliances,	which	can	
ensure	security.	Membership	in	special	international	organizations,	like	the	World	Trade	
Organization	or	World	Bank	can	increase	access	to	markets	and	provide	financial	
resources.	When	domestic	sovereignty	is	under	attack,	international	recognition	can	
provide	a	level	of	legitimacy	to	the	government	by	signaling	that	those	in	power	have	
access	to	international	resources.	This	is	the	battle	that	is	currently	taking	place	in	
Venezuela,	with	the	presidential	conflict	between	President	Maduro	and	President	Guaido.	
When	the	election	was	contested,	and	Guaido	elected	by	the	National	Assembly,	Western	
countries	came	to	his	aid	by	recognizing	him	as	the	legitimate	president.	
 
3	Krasner,	“Problematic	Sovereignty,”	1.	
4	Krasner,	Sovereignty,	1.	
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The	general	concept	of	Westphalian	sovereignty	is	that	foreign	authorities	should	be	
excluded	from	the	affairs	of	a	state.	According	to	Krasner,	states	should	not	only	be	
independent,	but	also	autonomous.	He	concedes	that	governments	are	always	constrained	
to	an	extent	by	the	external	environment,	but	they	still	have	the	freedom	to	decide	things	
for	their	country.	This	is	connected	closely	to	domestic	politics,	as	Westphalian	sovereignty	
enables	a	government	to	“determine	the	character	of	its	own	domestic	sovereignty,	its	own	
authoritative	institutions.”5	In	the	case	of	neocolonialism	and	puppet	states,	Westphalian	
sovereignty	does	not	exist,	as	the	state	cannot	exercise	its	will	independent	from	the	
controlling	power.	The	last	Iranian	Shah	was	put	in	a	position	of	threatened	Westphalian	
sovereignty.	He	was	put	in	power	by	US	forces,	and	so	the	US	occasionally	“encouraged”	the	
Shah	to	act	in	a	way	favorable	to	US	interests.	Though	he	did	not	always	listen,	the	fact	that	
the	US	had	the	ability	to	do	this	suggests	the	Iranian	government,	under	the	Shah,	did	not	
hold	full	Westphalian	sovereignty.	
“International	legal	sovereignty	and	Westphalian	sovereignty	involve	issues	of	
authority	and	legitimacy,	but	not	control.”6	Domestic	sovereignty,	mentioned	briefly	in	the	
previous	paragraph,	concerns	control	and	authority	within	a	region.	Krasner	notes	that	the	
oldest	usages	of	“sovereignty”	generally	seem	to	refer	to	domestic	sovereignty,	which	does	
not	require	legitimacy	derived	from	international	recognition	(but	can	be	supported	by	it).	
What	Krasner	is	saying	here,	is	that	sovereignty	has	historically	referred	to	a	state’s	control	
over	a	certain	region.	This	control,	as	briefly	mentioned	regarding	international	legal	
sovereignty,	can	be	supported	by	recognition	from	other	states,	which	grants	legitimacy	in	
 
5	Krasner,	“Problematic	Sovereignty,”	11.	
6	Krasner,	Sovereignty,	4.	
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the	international	community.	Domestic	sovereignty	does	not	require	legitimacy,	as	seen	in	
the	19th	century	with	the	Confederate	States	of	America,	which	had	a	government	that	
enforced	laws	over	much	of	its	territory	but	lacked	any	official	recognition	from	foreign	
governments.	“Failed	states”	essentially	refer	to	states	where	the	government	is	incapable	
of	regulating	development	within	their	borders	and	does	not	hold	domestic	sovereignty	but	
could	still	hold	international	legal	sovereignty.	In	the	1980s	and	1990s,	Somalia	began	to	be	
described	as	a	failed	state,	due	to	the	inability	of	the	central	government	to	firmly	establish	
their	control	of	the	small	country	with	the	beginning	of	the	Somali	Civil	War.	
Krasner’s	mention	of	the	scholars	who	believe	that	globalization	is	eroding	
sovereignty	becomes	especially	relevant	in	discussion	of	interdependence	sovereignty.	
This	aspect	of	sovereignty	concerns	the	ability	of	a	state	to	regulate	movements	across	
their	own	borders.	There	have	been	various	arguments	that	ultimately	no	state	holds	this	
form	of	sovereignty,	due	to	the	inability	to	fully	control	what	can	pass	through	the	air	or	
water.	North	Korea	has	often	been	cited	as	the	one	state	with	interdependence	sovereignty,	
but	with	the	novel	coronavirus	having	infiltrated	their	borders,	that	is	not	a	strong	
argument.	Krasner	generally	refers	to	goods,	capital,	and	individuals	in	his	chapter,	
“Problematic	Sovereignty,”	though.	On	that	regard,	it	is	possible	for	a	state	to	control	this,	
though	it	may	be	incredibly	difficult.	Economic	international	organizations	present	the	
clearest	challenge	to	interdependence	sovereignty,	though.	People	from	countries	in	the	
European	Union	generally	have	the	freedom	to	pass	between	each	of	these	countries	freely.	
Though	trade	is	regulated,	the	people	are	ultimately	not	–	at	least	not	to	the	extent	that	the	
borders	between	the	US	and	its	northern	and	southern	neighbors	are.	Economic	
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cooperation	also	has	effects	on	the	other	forms	of	sovereignty,	however.	Both	international	
legal	sovereignty	and	domestic	sovereignty	can	be	affected	by	economic	integration.	
In	an	increasingly	globalized	world	full	of	economic	and	political	integration,	the	
question	of	sovereignty	becomes	more	and	more	relevant.	How	does	the	“one	country,	two	
systems”	model	influence	our	understanding	of	the	significance	and	function	of	
sovereignty?	Using	Krasner’s	framework,	this	question	can	be	explored	in	the	two	cases	of	
Hong	Kong	and	Taiwan.	Hong	Kong	was	the	first	territory	where	“one	country,	two	
systems”	was	implemented,	and	remains	the	best	example	of	the	result	of	forced	economic	
and	political	integration	between	China	and	a	territory	it	wishes	to	reclaim.	Though	Macau	
stands	as	another	example	of	the	model,	it	has	not	been	subject	to	the	same	constant	pro-
democracy	protests	that	Hong	Kong	has,	and	prior	to	its	retrocession,	there	was	no	
argument	as	to	whose	land	it	was.	Portugal	declared	the	colony	to	be	Chinese	land	under	
Portuguese	control.	Hong	Kong,	however,	has	had	a	different	relationship	with	China,	in	
part	due	to	its	history	with	the	United	Kingdom,	as	well	as	Governor	Patten’s	attempts	to	
democratize	Hong	Kong	prior	to	retrocession.	Though	Macau	is	subject	to	its	fair	share	of	
criticism,	it	does	not	have	the	same	tumultuous	relationship	with	China.	Additionally,	
Macau,	though	a	popular	tourist	destination,	is	not	a	global	economic	city	as	Hong	Kong	
was	and	continues	to	be.	
“One	country,	two	systems”	was	originally	designed	with	Taiwan	in	mind,	in	part	
because	Taiwan	would	present	the	most	difficulty	in	unification.	The	government	on	
Taiwan	was	the	legacy	of	a	rival	political	party	that	had,	in	the	eyes	of	the	PRC,	committed	
treason.	After	a	few	decades,	martial	law	and	one-party	dictatorship	gave	way	to	
democracy	and	the	establishment	of	a	liberal	democratic	political	culture	in	Taiwan.	This	
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formation	of	a	successful	multi-party	democracy	makes	Taiwan	a	particularly	interesting	
case	regarding	unification	with	an	authoritarian	communist	superpower.	The	rapidly	
changing	politics	on	the	island	have	created	an	environment	in	which	anything	could	
happen	in	relation	to	China.	With	every	new	president,	the	two	sides	of	the	Taiwan	Strait	
could	move	closer	together	or	further	apart.	The	Economic	Cooperation	Framework	
Agreement	(ECFA),	which	lead	to	closer	economic	ties,	was	signed	by	a	KMT	President,	Ma	
Ying-jeou,	but	he	was	succeeded	by	DPP	president	Tsai	Ing-wen,	who	has	gone	about	
diversifying	Taiwan’s	foreign	economic	connections.	Taiwan	becomes	an	interesting	case	to	
examine	the	development	of	certain	forms	of	sovereignty	and	the	effect	that	has	on	the	
future	of	“one	country,	two	systems.”	 	
9	
	
 Hong	Kong	and	“One	Country,	Two	Systems”	
Shortly	after	the	conclusion	of	World	War	II,	the	rivalry	between	the	Chinese	
Nationalist	organization,	the	Kuomintang	(KMT),	and	the	Communist	party	resumed	after	
they	successfully	expelled	the	Japanese	from	the	mainland.	Within	a	matter	of	months,	the	
Communists	had	succeeded	in	seizing	a	large	majority	of	mainland	China,	establishing	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China	(PRC).	This	forced	the	KMT	to	flee	to	the	island	of	Taiwan,	
where	they	established	the	Republic	of	China	(ROC,	Taiwan).	Initially,	the	Communists	had	
planned	on	a	military	conquest	of	the	island	as	part	of	their	mission	of	unification	of	the	
country,	and	at	the	turn	of	the	decade,	it	seemed	likely	that	an	attack	was	imminent.	The	
United	States	(US),	through	President	Truman,	had	even	backed	off	on	support	of	the	KMT,	
and	declared	that	the	US	considered	Taiwan	a	part	of	China	–	the	Communist	China.	This	
did	not	last	very	long,	as	once	the	Korean	war	started,	the	US	quickly	deployed	troops	to	
the	Taiwan	Strait	to	prevent	an	attack	from	either	the	PRC	or	the	ROC.	The	situation	in	
Korea	had	increased	fears	in	the	US	that	a	larger	campaign	by	the	communists	was	being	
planned.	Though	the	US’s	main	goal	might	have	not	been	to	save	the	Nationalists	–	merely	
stop	the	Communists	–	the	end	result	was	that	the	KMT	survived	and	retained	its	seat	in	
the	United	Nations	(UN).7	The	presence	of	US	forces	and	the	existence	of	a	new	mutual	
defense	treaty	between	the	ROC	and	the	US	did	not	stop	the	PRC	from	attempting	to	
provoke	the	ROC.	In	the	late	1950s,	the	PRC	artillery	began	shelling	ROC-controlled	islands	
near	Taiwan	in	an	attempt	to	test	the	ROC’s	willingness	to	hold	their	control	over	the	
islands.8	
 
7	Richard	Bush,	Untying	the	Knot:	Making	Peace	in	the	Taiwan	Strait	(Washington,	DC:	The	Brookings	
Institution,	2005),	17-18.	
8	Bush,	Untying	the	Knot,	19.	
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The	policies	of	conquest	that	both	the	ROC	and	PRC	held	were	the	status	quo	for	
over	a	decade.	A	change	first	began	to	appear	in	the	1970s,	with	the	rise	of	the	Nixon	
administration	in	the	US.	Though	ultimately	unsuccessful,	it	was	President	Nixon	and	
Henry	Kissinger	who	brought	the	idea	of	a	peaceful	resolution	to	the	PRC.	President	Carter	
attempted	to	do	the	same	as	Nixon,	in	trying	to	convince	the	PRC	of	the	importance	of	
peace.	President	Carter	made	several	concessions	to	the	PRC,	specifically	cutting	formal	
diplomatic	ties	with	the	ROC,	in	trying	to	convince	them	of	the	need	to	consider	peaceful	
reconciliation.9		
It	was	in	this	context	that	the	PRC	introduced	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	model	
to	reunite	the	PRC	and	ROC.	However,	reunification	under	this	model	was	first	applied	in	
practice	in	Hong	Kong.	This	project	is	intended	to	explore	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	
model	in	relation	to	the	ROC	and	its	views	on	reunification	with	the	PRC.	However,	Hong	
Kong	must	be	discussed	first,	as	it	was	the	first	region	where	the	model	was	implemented.	
Although	the	model	was	formulated	and	proposed	for	Taiwan	in	the	late	1970s,	and	early	
1980s,	Taiwan	rejected	the	proposal.	Consequently,	Hong	Kong	exists	as	the	earliest,	and	
perhaps	most	important,	concrete	example	of	the	model,	and	stands	as	a	parallel	example	
of	hybrid	sovereignty.		
Though	Hong	Kong	was	followed	by	the	region	of	Macau	shortly	after,	Macau	is	not	
necessarily	an	important	example	to	consider,	in	part	because	the	systems	set	up	in	each	
region	are	identical,	having	been	based	on	the	one	country,	two	systems	model.		
Additionally,	the	process	to	handover	Macau	began	well	before	the	formulation	of	the	
model,	after	Portugal	declared	the	region	“Chinese	territory	under	Portuguese	
 
9	Bush,	Untying	the	Knot,	22.		
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administration,”	in	the	mid-1970s.10	As	a	result,	Hong	Kong	is	the	best	example	to	use	as	
the	primary	concrete	example	of	the	implementation	of	the	model.	
 Formulating	the	Model	
With	the	US’s	recognition	of	the	PRC,	along	with	the	seat	in	the	UN,	the	PRC	had	the	
advantage,	but	at	the	end	of	the	1970s,	the	PRC	abandoned	their	ideas	of	a	military	
conquest	to	retake	the	island	of	Taiwan	in	favor	of	a	“peaceful	unification”	policy.	The	PRC	
by	then	was	unprepared	to	impose	a	military	solution,	and	the	new	alliance	with	the	US	
further	cemented	in	Deng	Xiaoping’s	mind	the	idea	that	military	conquest	was	no	longer	an	
option	–	to	attempt	a	military	invasion	would	have	driven	the	US	away	from	the	PRC.11	This	
new	policy	put	a	heavy	emphasis	on	advertising	the	opening	of	economic	connections	
between	the	two	rival	governments.	This	would	be	further	developed	in	1981	by	a	senior	
CCP	official,	Ye	Jianying,	who	first	spoke	about	the	PRC’s	reunification	proposal	of	“one	
country,	two	systems”	in	his	“Nine-Point	Proposal.”	His	proposal,	though	brief,	outlined	the	
basic	concepts	that	would	be	further	developed,	and	eventually	implemented	in	Hong	
Kong.	On	the	terms	of	understanding	the	circumstances	under	which	reunification	could	
occur,	Ye	Jianying	suggested	the	two	sides	meet	to	first	discuss	each	side’s	views	on	various	
matters,	as	well	as	come	to	arrangements	on	the	facilitation	of	academic	and	cultural	
exchanges,	as	well	as	reuniting	families	and	inviting	tourists.	Following	that,	Taiwan	and	
the	ROC	would	be	reabsorbed	by	the	PRC,	but	still	exist	with	“a	high	degree	of	autonomy	as	
a	special	administrative	region.”12	This	level	of	autonomy	would	guarantee	the	PRC’s	
 
10	SL	Wong,	R	Cremer,	Entrepreneurs	and	Enterprises	in	Macau:	A	Study	of	Industrial	Development	(Hong	Kong:	
Hong	Kong	University	Press,	1991),	175.	
11	Bush,	Untying	the	Knot,	23.		
12	Ye	Jianying,	“Nine-Points	Proposal,”	interview	with	Xinhua	News	Agency,	September	30,	1981,	
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/3568_665529/t17783.shtml.	
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central	government	would	not	interfere	with	local	politics,	and	the	people	of	Taiwan	could	
even	participate	in	the	government	of	the	PRC	as	a	whole.	The	socio-economic	system	
would	remain	unchanged	–	the	capitalist	economy	in	place	would	be	allowed	to	remain	in	
operation,	and	in	the	event	that	Taiwan	had	economic	issues,	the	government	of	the	PRC	
would	subsidize	them	in	respect	to	the	situation	at	the	time.		The	people	of	Taiwan,	as	well	
as	people	of	any	other	nationality,	would	have	the	option	to	live	on	the	mainland,	and	have	
the	freedom	to	come	and	go	as	they	please.	The	most	shocking	part	of	the	Nine-Points	
proposal,	though,	was	the	PRC’s	willingness	to	permit	Taiwan	to	not	only	keep	ties	with	
other	countries	(albeit	in	nongovernmental	ways	–	the	Nine-Points	proposal	specified	
economic	and	cultural	relations),	but	also	to	keep	armed	forces.13	
A	few	months	after	Ye	Jianying	revealed	the	PRC’s	plan	for	reunification,	China’s	
paramount	leader,	Deng	Xiaoping,	made	statements	clarifying	many	of	Ye’s	points,	as	well	
as	adding	some	new	ideas.	He	made	clear	that	the	two	systems	“one	country,	two	systems”	
referred	to	were	the	economic	systems,	socialism	and	capitalism.	He	also	specified	
that	under	this	principle,	the	“special	administrative	region”	of	Taiwan	would	not	have	
complete	autonomy	–	as	that	would	mean	two	separate	Chinas.	Taiwan	would	still	need	to	
be	subservient	to	the	mainland	PRC	government,	and	the	PRC	government	would	need	to	
be	the	sole	international	representative	of	all	of	China.	“Complete	autonomy	means	two	
Chinas,	not	one.	Different	systems	may	be	practiced,	but	it	must	be	the	People’s	Republic	of	
China	alone	that	represents	China	internationally.”14	Additionally,	though	Taiwan	could	
retain	its	armed	forces,	that	was	conditional	on	if	the	armed	forces	posed	a	threat	to	PRC-
 
13	Ye,	“Nine	Points	Proposal.”	
14	Deng	Xiaoping,	“An	Idea	for	the	Peaceful	Reunification	of	the	Chinese	Mainland	and	Taiwan,”	in	Selected	
Works	of	Deng	Xiaoping,	Volume	III	(Beijing:	Foreign	Languages	Press,	1994),	40.		
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China.	A	major	new	idea	Deng	brought	to	the	discussion	was	on	the	subject	of	judicial	
matters.	Taiwan	would	have	an	independent	judicial	system	that	would	have	the	power	of	
final	judgment	in	court.15	
Though	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	principle	may	have	initially	been	formulated	
for	a	reunification	with	Taiwan,	Hong	Kong	was	the	first	territory	where	the	principle	was	
implemented.	Prior	to	the	reforms	in	the	1990s	and	retrocession	itself,	Hong	Kong	was	a	
non-democratic	city-state	under	the	control	of	the	United	Kingdom,	which	appointed	a	
governor	for	the	region.	Following	the	end	of	World	War	II,	Hong	Kong	experienced	
incredible	growth,	both	in	the	economy	as	well	as	the	population.16	Though	the	British	
government	in	Hong	Kong	had	avoided	a	Communist	invasion,	by	the	1960s	government	
leaders	knew	that	the	PRC	would	eventually	pose	a	threat	and	began	analyzing	how	to	
handle	the	Hong	Kong-PRC	connection.	The	then-Governor	Trench	mapped	out	his	
understanding	on	the	Hong	Kong-PRC	relationship,	noting	that	the	status	quo	could	
continue	so	long	as	China	did	not	gain	an	economic	advantage	from	Hong	Kong,	as	well	as	
long	as	Hong	Kong	continued	to	be	useful	to	the	West.	Trench	also	noted	the	difficulty	that	
the	PRC	would	have	in	attempting	to	assimilate	Hong	Kong.	He	also	considered	the	possible	
factors	that	could	lead	to	a	Chinese-takeover	of	the	region.	He	speculated	that	if	the	British	
government	in	charge	could	not	retain	control	over	what	happened	in	the	colony	–	
specifically	in	regard	to	protests	or	possible	pro-democratic	activists	–	then	the	UK	would	
risk	losing	the	city-state.	
 
15	Bush,	Untying	the	Knot,	38.		
16	Roger	Buckley,	Hong	Kong:	The	Road	to	1997	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1997),	54.		
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	In	1982,	during	a	talk	with	then-British	Prime	Minister	Margaret	Thatcher,	Deng	
Xiaoping	began	to	lay	out	the	ideas	that	he	intended	to	be	the	framework	for	which	a	Hong	
Kong	basic	law	would	be	designed.	In	brief	remarks,	he	made	clear	his	goal	for	
retrocession:	the	continued	prosperity	of	Hong	Kong.		
In	order	to	ensure	the	continued	prosperity	of	the	region,	Deng	said	that	the	Beijing	
government	would	not	interfere	with	Hong	Kong,	for	the	most	part.	Instead,	Hong	Kong	
would	be	allowed	to	continue	with	a	capitalist	economy	and	remain	a	free	port.	Moreover,	
in	the	government	turnover	from	the	British	who	had	enforced	colonial	rule	during	their	
lease	of	the	territory,	a	new	democratic	Hong	Kong	government	would	be	created.	Deng	
saw	it	important	to	have	the	Hong	Kongese	on	the	side	of	the	PRC,	in	part	due	to	the	
widespread	concern	that	if	prosperity	in	Hong	Kong	was	not	maintained,	the	push	for	
modernization	in	mainland	China	would	be	set	back.17	
Two	years	later,	only	a	few	months	away	from	the	signing	of	the	Sino-British	Joint	
Declaration,	Deng	clarified	and	repeated	some	of	his	earlier	comments	on	the	retaking	of	
Hong	Kong.	On	the	subject	of	the	free	economy,	he	reaffirmed	the	commitment	to	keeping	
Hong	Kong	a	“free	port,”	able	to	engage	in	trade	with	international	entities.	In	regard	to	the	
new,	post-British,	government,	the	Hong	Kongese	would	elect	their	own	government	
without	intervention	from	the	Beijing	government.	Despite	these	efforts	at	supporting	an	
idea	of	a	wholly	“free”	Hong	Kong,	Deng	did	make	mention	of	the	intent	to	station	Chinese	
 
17	Deng	Xiaoping,	“Our	Basic	Position	on	the	Question	of	Hong	Kong,”	in	Selected	Works	of	Deng	Xiaoping,	
Volume	III,	(Beijing:	Foreign	Languages	Press,	1994),	24.	
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troops	in	Hong	Kong,	though	he	stated	it	would	only	be	for	the	purpose	of	safeguarding	
national	security	and	enforcing	sovereignty	over	the	territory.18	
The	economics	of	Hong	Kong	were	not	only	important	to	Deng,	though.	The	British	
similarly	had	concerns	regarding	Hong	Kong’s	economy	post-retrocession.	Toward	the	end	
of	the	Chinese	Civil	War,	industries	began	abandoning	mainland	China	in	favor	of	Hong	
Kong.	Industry	grew	incredibly	fast.	In	1947	there	were	only	961	factories	employing	less	
than	50,000	people;	but	in	1959,	there	were	4,541	factories	employing	more	than	3	times	
the	1947	numbers.19	Starting	in	the	early	1950s,	the	UK	pushed	for	more	economic	growth	
in	the	region	and	was	among	the	first	of	the	Western	powers	to	recognize	the	PRC-China.	
Recognition	enabled	Hong	Kong	to	continue	commercial	activities	and	trading	with	China’s	
mainland	provinces.20	The	economic	growth	connected	to	ties	with	the	PRC	led	to	the	
establishment	of	Hong	Kong	as	an	international	financial	center	beginning	in	the	early	
1980s.21	Hong	Kong	became	incredibly	important	to	the	UK	as	a	commercial	and	financial	
center	in	the	Far	East	for	not	just	the	UK,	but	the	West	as	a	whole.	It	was	an	additional	
market	for	British	exports.	Additionally,	the	Hong	Kong	connection	gave	“substance”	to	the	
UK’s	relations	with	PRC-China.	The	last	point	for	why	Hong	Kong	was	so	important	to	the	
UK,	though,	is	perhaps	the	reason	that	truly	pushed	the	UK	to	fight	for	continuing	economic	
prosperity	on	their	terms.	The	UK	used	Hong	Kong	as	a	communications,	intelligence,	and	
air	services	center	to	keep	tabs	on	the	countries	in	the	Far	East.22	
 
18	Deng	Xiaoping,	“One	Country,	Two	Systems,”	in	Selected	Works	of	Deng	Xiaoping,	Volume	III,	(Beijing:	
Foreign	Languages	Press,	1994),	68.	
19	Liu	Shuyong,	“Hong	Kong:	A	Survey	of	Its	Political	and	Economic	Development	over	the	Past	150	Years,”	in	
The	China	Quarterly,	no.	151	(September	1997):	589.	
20	Liu,	“Hong	Kong,”	588.		
21	Liu,	“Hong	Kong,”.589.	
22	Margaret	Thatcher	Foundation,	Hong	Kong	(Future	of	Hong	Kong)	Part	1,	pt.	6,	published	September	12,	
1982,	https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/138542,	(Accessed	October	27,	2019).	
16	
	
In	the	early	negotiations,	the	British	had	attempted	to	negotiate	a	system	in	which	
the	UK	could	continue	to	govern	Hong	Kong,	while	still	handing	Hong	Kong	back	to	the	PRC.	
In	early	1982,	a	note	to	Prime	Minister	Margaret	Thatcher	mentioned	that	the	UK	was	vital	
to	the	economic	prosperity	of	Hong	Kong,	and	that	the	PRC	did	not	have	the	confidence	of	
the	world	on	their	side.	“If	[nixing	the	idea	continuing	the	British	administration]	is	in	the	
minds	of	the	Chinese,	they	have	clearly	misunderstood	the	basis	of	Hong	Kong’s	prosperity.	
Confidence	in	the	Territory,	particularly	among	investors,	is	likely	only	to	be	maintained	if	
autonomy	is	guaranteed	by	the	administration	continuing	on	the	same	lines,	ie	through	the	
British.”23	“From	the	most	negative	viewpoint,	a	British	pull-out	would	create	enormous	
problems	for	us.	Our	political	and	economic	interests	in	the	Far	East	would	suffer…”24	They	
doubled-down	on	this	logic	in	mid-1982	with	the	release	of	a	study	on	the	future	of	Hong	
Kong,	where	it	was	noted	that	“the	Governor’s	advice	is	that	the	colony	as	it	now	exists	will	
collapse	economically	and	then	politically	through	lack	of	confidence	and	uncertainty.”25	
Through	these	documents,	it	becomes	clear	that	the	UK	was	also	concerned	about	the	
future	of	the	Hong	Kong	economy,	and	ultimately	wanted	to	ensure	the	prosperity	of	the	
economy	was	maintained.	They	differed	from	the	PRC	in	thinking	that	the	reason	for	the	
prosperity	was	the	confidence	foreign	investors	had	in	the	British	government.	To	the	
British,	they	had	a	good	reason	for	thinking	this,	as	“without	the	continuity	and	
predictability	of	administration,	law	and	tax	structures	and	the	independent	convertible	
currency	guaranteed	by	British	control	Hong	Kong	would	not	have	developed	as	a	major	
 
23	Margaret	Thatcher	Foundation,	Hong	Kong,	Part	1,	pt.	4.		
24	Margaret	Thatcher	Foundation,	Hong	Kong,	Part	1,	pt.	5.		
25	Margaret	Thatcher	Foundation,	Hong	Kong,	Part	1,	pt.	3.		
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trading	force	and	the	world’s	third	largest	financial	centre.”26	An	interesting	thing	to	note	is	
that	the	British	did	not	seem	to	want	to	keep	control	over	Hong	Kong	forever.	They	note	in	
the	documents	that	they	would	only	stay	in	place	until	confidence	was	established	that	the	
PRC	was	capable	of	keeping	the	economy	strong.	
Though	the	British	thought	of	themselves	as	important	in	regard	to	the	economic	
well-being	of	Hong	Kong,	they	did	not	demonstrate	control	over	the	region.	On	the	matters	
of	currency	and	banking,	a	study	that	was	commissioned	on	the	future	of	Hong	Kong	noted	
that	despite	technically	having	certain	powers	over	the	executive	and	legislative	matters,	
the	Hong	Kong	government	“runs	its	financial	affairs	quite	independently	of	HMG	[Her	
Majesty’s	Government].”27	Though	the	UK’s	Treasury	did	have	certain	responsibilities	
regarding	formal	approval	on	the	minting	of	a	new	coin	or	demonetization	of	a	coin,	neither	
the	British	Treasury,	nor	the	Bank	of	England	had	any	formal	relationship	or	functions	to	
carry	out	with	the	Hong	Kong	government.	
 The	Sino-British	Joint	Declaration	
The	Sino-British	Joint	Declaration	that	followed	at	the	end	of	1984	laid	out	in	
writing	what	Deng	had	been	saying	since	1982	and	was	the	starting	point	for	the	
negotiations	between	China	and	the	United	Kingdom.	The	ideas	of	the	democratic	
government	that	would	be	implemented	and	the	continuance	of	the	free	economy	and	legal	
system	were	seemingly	cemented	with	this	declaration.	The	Hong	Kong	Special	
Administrative	Region	(HKSAR)	would	essentially	be	independent,	save	for	the	occasional	
 
26	Margaret	Thatcher	Foundation,	Hong	Kong	(Future	of	Hong	Kong),	Part	2,	pt.	15,	published	September	12,	
1982,	https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/138543,	(Accessed	October	27,	2019).		
27	Margaret	Thatcher	Foundation,	Hong	Kong	(Future	of	Hong	Kong),	Annex	I,	pt.	1,	published	September	12,	
1982,	https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/138553,	(Accessed	October	28,	2019).		
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reminder	from	Beijing	that	HKSAR	was	subservient	to	them.	On	the	terms	of	its	legal	
system,	HKSAR	would	be	permitted	to	keep	all	of	its	current	laws.	The	only	exceptions	
would	be	those	which	would	contradict	the	Basic	Law.	The	only	method	for	the	laws	to	be	
amended	would	be	through	the	HKSAR	legislature.	On	the	subject	of	the	judicial	system,	the	
text	went	as	far	to	say	that	with	Hong	Kong’s	high	degree	of	autonomy,	the	region	would	
have	the	power	of	“final	adjudication.”28	The	courts	would	have	the	ability	to	exercise	
judicial	power	independent	from	any	interference.	China’s	statement	on	this	matter	was	
not	only	to	assure	the	citizens	of	Hong	Kong	that	China	would	not	interfere,	but	to	also	
make	a	point	that	the	British	would	not	be	allowed	to	do	so	either	–	this	was	a	point	rather	
important	to	the	PRC	at	the	time,	who	were	concerned	that	the	British	would	attempt	to	do	
something	which	would	threaten	the	relationship	between	China	and	HKSAR.	Despite	this	
concern,	the	PRC	was	not	going	to	order	the	expulsion	of	British	officials	from	HKSAR.	In	
the	Joint	Declaration,	the	PRC	stated	that	they	would	allow	the	HKSAR	to	continue	to	
employ	all	currently	serving	public	servants,	including	British	and	other	foreigners,	and	
they	could	newly	hire	foreigners.	The	only	positions	foreigners	would	be	forbidden	to	hold	
were	as	the	heads	of	government	departments.		
 China’s	Experiments	with	Capitalism	
Following	the	ratification	of	the	Sino-British	Joint	Declaration,	Hong	Kong’s	
economy,	along	with	its	political	system,	began	to	enter	a	transitional	period.	Hong	Kong	
started	to	move	away	from	the	idea	a	diverse	economy	based	on	manufacturing	industries	
 
28	The	Joint	Declaration	of	the	Government	of	the	United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	and	the	
Government	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	on	the	Question	of	Hong	Kong,	Government	of	the	Hong	Kong	
Special	Administrative	Region.	https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/joint3.htm	(Accessed	October	12,	
2019).	
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and	external	trade	in	favor	of	a	system	more	akin	to	a	service	economy.	The	proportion	of	
Hong	Kong’s	GDP	that	came	from	manufacturing	decreased	by	more	than	50%.29		
The	continuing	prosperity	of	Hong	Kong	was	incredibly	important	to	Deng	Xiaoping,	
and	this	comes	across	in	China’s	expansion	on	the	policies	from	the	joint	declaration.	One	
of	the	words	most	frequently	used	was	“maintain,”	which	shows	a	clear	indication	that	the	
Chinese	government,	or	at	least	those	drafting	the	declaration	and	eventually	basic	law,	
understood	Hong	Kong’s	system	at	that	time	to	be	the	best	system	to	continue	under	–	or	at	
least	the	one	least	likely	to	bring	failure.	
In	Deng’s	initial	expansion	of	Ye	Jianying’s	Nine-Point	proposal	for	Taiwan,	it	was	
made	clear	that	his	view	of	“one	country,	two	systems”	was	that	it	was	primarily	an	
economic	one	–	a	view	that	carried	into	the	Hong	Kong	proposal.	There	was	a	good	reason	
for	this,	as	Deng,	since	the	beginning,	had	worked	on	economic	modernization	for	China.	He	
pursued	economic	modernization	due	to	his	beliefs	on	how	to	build	and	maintain	a	strong,	
robust	economy;	“he	was	convinced	that	a	robust	economy	thrived	on	competition…”30	
Hong	Kong	was	a	region	where	such	a	robust	economy	existed.	When	it	came	to	its	
importance	to	the	Chinese	economy,	Hong	Kong,	as	a	capitalist	free	port,	had	long	been	a	
place	where	the	Beijing	government	could	“earn	foreign	currency,	import	technology,	and	
gain	information	about	the	world.”31	The	free	territory	was	incredibly	important	to	the	
economy	Deng	was	working	to	strengthen.	In	1983,	Hong	Kong	accounted	for	28%	of	
Chinese	exports,	70%	of	the	exports	from	Hong	Kong	to	China	were	produced	in	other	
 
29	Liu,	“Hong	Kong,”	589.	
30	Ezra	Vogel,	Deng	Xiaoping	and	the	Transformation	of	China	(Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	The	Belknap	Press	
of	Harvard	University	Press,	2011),	423.	
31	Vogel,	Deng	Xiaoping,	489.	
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countries,	and	China	planned	to	increase	exports	and	imports	to/from	Hong	Kong	over	the	
following	years.	In	all,	China’s	earnings	from	Hong	Kong	at	the	time	were	nearly	$7	billion	
every	year.32	
China	had	also	begun	testing	market-oriented	economic	reforms	with	the	
establishment	of	Special	Economic	Zones	(SEZs).	In	1980,	Shenzhen,	Zhuhai,	Shantou,	and	
Xiamen	were	all	designated	as	SEZs.	Established	far	from	Beijing	to	minimalize	political	
interference,	the	regions	were	“encouraged	to	pursue	pragmatic	and	open	economic	
policies	that	would	serve	as	a	test	for	innovative	policies	that,	if	proven	successful,	would	
be	implemented	more	widely	across	the	country.”33	These	locations	were	strategically	
chosen	because	of	their	physical	location	–	the	coastal	provinces	of	Guangdong	and	Fujian.	
These	provinces	had	a	history	of	contact	with	the	outside	world	and	were	relatively	close	
to	Hong	Kong	and	Taiwan.	Shenzhen	in	particular	was	chosen	due	to	it	being	located	across	
a	river	from	Hong	Kong;	the	goal	was	that	Shenzhen	would	provide	an	opportunity	for	
China	to	learn	how	to	model	capitalist	growth	and	develop	modern	technologies.34	The	
opening	of	the	SEZs	led	to	unprecedented	rates	of	economic	growth	in	China,	and	the	SEZs	
quickly	developed	markets	in	a	variety	of	industries.35	
The	huge	success	of	the	SEZs	lead	to	Beijing	creating	a	variant	of	the	SEZs,	known	as	
“economic	and	technological	development	zones”	(ETDZs).	ETDZs	differed	from	the	SEZs	in	
being	much	smaller.	The	booming	success	of	both	the	SEZs	and	ETDZs,	as	well	as	the	other	
 
32	Margaret	Thatcher	Foundation,	“The	economic	value	of	Hong	Kong	to	China”	Hong	Kong,	published	March	
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34	Zeng,	China’s	Special	Economic	Zones,	7.	
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varieties	of	SEZ36,	led	to	the	central	government	granting	more	and	more	provinces	and	
cities	the	status	of	SEZ.	By	1990,	there	were	six	SEZs,	and	by	1992,	over	40	ETDZs.37	China	
was	becoming	familiar	with	how	to	manage	a	capitalist	region	and	ensure	strong	economic	
growth.	With	these	“zones,”	China	had	effectively	proven	the	UK’s	fears	wrong.	Hong	Kong	
would	be	able	to	maintain	economic	prosperity	under	PRC	rule.	
The	idea,	then,	that	Communist	China	was	so	willing	to	allow	Hong	Kong	to	remain	a	
capitalist	haven	is	not	as	shocking	as	it	initially	seems.	Competition,	a	major	component	of	
capitalism,	does	not	necessarily	work	with	communism	-	up	until	reforms	in	the	rural	
regions	of	China,	collective	farming	was	the	way	of	life,	and	it	was	failing.	As	Deng	had	
already	been	accused	of	taking	the	“capitalist	road”	years	before,	and	considering	that	such	
a	path	was	not	favored	by	the	CCP,	Deng’s	commitment	to	Hong	Kong	was	a	way	for	him	to	
more	properly	test	his	ideas	on	what	makes	a	strong	economy,	while	still	staying	on	the	
good	side	of	the	rest	of	the	CCP	and	maintaining	power.38	
Up	until	mid-1985,	Deng	continued	to	espouse	the	ideas	of	status	quo	in	Hong	Kong	
to	the	public	and	in	private,	never	yielding	from	his	belief	in	the	ability	to	ensure	economic	
prosperity	in	the	region.	In	October	1984,	Deng	spoke	with	visitors	from	Hong	Kong	during	
the	National	Day	celebrations.	In	these	talks,	he	continuously	spoke	of	his	desire	to	
guarantee	a	democratic	government	in	the	region	and	spoke	of	his	trust	that	Beijing’s	
policies	on	Hong	Kong	would	never	change,	noting	“Some	people	are	worried	that	China's	
 
36	High-tech	industrial	development	zones	(HIDZs);	Free	Trade	zones	(FTZs),	and	export-processing	zones	
(EPZs)	are	several	of	the	most	common	variants.	
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policy	may	change	once	we	are	no	longer	around	.	.	.	But	today	I	should	like	to	assure	you	
that	China's	policy	will	not	change;	nobody	can	change	it,	because	it	is	right	and	effective	
and	enjoys	the	support	of	the	people.”	39	To	put	it	simply,	Deng	believed	in	the	power	of	the	
people,	particularly	in	this	regard	–	anyone	who	chose	to	stand	against	this	policy	would	
face	heavy	opposition.	Following	these	1985	speeches,	though,	Deng	did	not	speak	often	on	
Hong	Kong	and	retrocession	until	the	90s.	It	was	in	1985	that	work	on	the	first	draft	of	
Hong	Kong	Basic	Law	had	begun,	building	upon	the	framework	established	by	the	Sino-
British	joint	declaration	a	year	earlier.	The	text	ordered	that	a	“socialist	system	and	policies	
will	not	be	practiced	in	the	HKSAR;	instead	capitalism	shall	prevail	for	50	years.”40		
 The	Drafting	of	Basic	Law	
Involved	in	the	creation	of	Hong	Kong	Basic	Law	was	the	Basic	Law	Drafting	
Committee	(BLDC).	After	planning	out	the	structure	of	the	Basic	Law,	the	BLDC	established	
5	special	groups	to	focus	on	different	topics	in	relation	to	the	Basic	Law:	The	Special	Group	
Concerned	with	the	Relationship	between	the	Central	Authorities	and	the	Hong	Kong	
Special	Administrative	Region;	the	Special	Group	Concerned	with	Fundamental	Rights	and	
Duties	of	Residents;	the	Special	Group	Concerned	with	the	Political	Structure;	the	Special	
Group	concerned	with	the	Economy;	and	the	Special	Group	concerned	with	Education,	
Science,	Technology,	Culture,	Sports,	and	Religion.		Each	of	these	committees	were	
responsible	for	drafting	different	sections	of	the	Basic	Law,	and	after	completing	the	first	
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draft,	a	General	Working	Group	was	established	to	revise	and	adjust	the	drafts.41	When	it	
came	to	the	BLDC	and	Basic	Law	itself,	the	PRC	understood	that	the	support	of	the	Hong	
Kongese	would	be	crucial	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	Basic	Law.	In	the	forming	of	the	BLDC,	the	
PRC	sought	to	feature	proper	representation	of	the	Hong	Kongese	but	could	not	hold	
elections	in	Hong	Kong,	and	in	the	end	the	PRC	simply	appointed	Hong	Kong	
representatives	to	the	BLDC.	They	made	no	attempt	to	silence	any	voices,	either.	It	was	
already	relatively	small	committee	–	only	59	members	total	were	in	charge	of	creating	the	
Hong	Kong	Basic	Law,	23	of	which	were	from	Hong	Kong	–	and	on	the	committee	sat	not	
only	pro-Beijing	members,	but	also	two	pro-democracy	members,	Szeto	Wah	and	Martin	
Lee.		
Martin	Lee	wrote	on	his	thoughts	regarding	what	the	Sino-British	Joint	Declaration	
had	proposed,	and	he	continued	this	writing	as	the	BLDC	began	drafting	the	Basic	Law.	He	
was	generally	opposed	to	the	concept	of	reunification	–	at	least	in	the	beginning.	Instead,	
Lee	promoted	the	idea	of	a	confederation	between	Hong	Kong	and	China.42	Though	widely	
rejected,	what	Lee	proposed	was	a	clear	representation	of	Hong	Kong’s	pro-democracy	
movement.	A	confederation	would	have	created	a	system	in	which	Hong	Kong	would	unite	
with	China	but	would	be	more	able	to	ensure	continuance	of	its	free	economy,	and	proper	
implementation	of	liberal	democracy	in	the	territory.	After	the	Tiananmen	Square	
massacre	in	1989,	both	Szeto	Wah	and	Martin	Lee	resigned	from	the	BLDC,	along	with	a	
few	other	members	of	the	liberal	pro-democracy	movement	in	Hong	Kong.	Szeto	Wah	
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called	for	a	general	strike,	and	Martin	Lee	noted	“This	is	the	darkest	hour	of	human	
civilization.	I	think	they	have	gone	completely	mad.”43	
The	representatives	faced	a	difficult	situation	in	having	to	appeal	to	the	Hong	
Kongese,	while	also	working	on	behalf	of	the	PRC’s	agenda,	all	without	being	seen	as	
challenging	the	British	government	that	still	reigned.	These	representatives	were	asked	to	
not	only	offer	a	point	of	view	from	one	of	the	“two	systems,”	but	to	also	be	representative	
of	the	“one	country.”	With	the	announcement	of	the	committee	also	came	the	clear	message	
once	more	that	the	PRC’s,	and	by	extension	the	BLDC’s,	top	priority	was	to	maintain	
stability	and	prosperity.	The	PRC’s	23	Hong	Kong	appointments	to	the	BLDC	were	almost	
all	businessmen	and	industrialists	in	the	territory.44	The	reason	for	specifically	having	
businessmen	in	the	BLDC	was	largely	because	the	PRC	was	dedicated	to	maintaining	Hong	
Kong’s	attraction	to	foreign	investors.45	As	I’ve	mentioned	previously,	the	UK	believed	that	
their	presence	was	vital	to	this,	but	it	seems	the	PRC	had	different	ideas.	They	read	the	
situation	to	mean	that	the	confidence	was	not	in	the	British	control	or	influence,	but	rather	
in	the	businesses	that	already	existed.	In	a	sense,	the	British	had	already	helped	put	in	
place	the	system	that	allowed	the	PRC	to	stand	their	ground	in	the	negotiations	over	if	the	
UK	could	continue	to	govern.	
As	the	Hong	Kong	representatives	needed	to	be	in	the	position	to	consider	points	of	
view	from	both	systems,	their	first	order	of	business	was	to	establish	the	Basic	Law	
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Consultative	Committee	(BLCC).	The	function	of	this	committee	was	to	understand	the	will	
of	the	Hong	Kong	people	–	since	the	BLDC	was	meant	to	function	according	to	the	will	of	all	
Chinese	people,	including	Hong	Kong,	they	needed	an	organization	inside	the	city	that	
could	accurately	report	on	the	sentiments	expressed	by	the	Hong	Kongese.	Despite	the	
BLCC	initially	meaning	to	be	independent	and	not	subordinate	to	the	BLDC,	several	of	the	
Hong	Kongese	on	the	BLDC	joined	the	BLCC	and	gave	control	to	the	BLDC.	
Despite	the	creation	of	the	BLCC	and	the	presence	of	pro-democracy	activists	in	
their	ranks,	the	Hong	Kongese	appointed	to	the	BLDC	did	not	seem	to	care	very	strongly	
towards	the	issues	they	would	be	discussing46,	and	neither	did	the	people	of	Hong	Kong	
later	on.	By	1988,	only	half	of	the	Hong	Kongese	had	even	picked	up	copies	of	the	draft	
Basic	Law,	and	even	fewer	had	read	it	or	could	comment	on	the	various	articles	in	the	draft.	
 The	Basic	Law	of	the	Hong	Kong	Special	Administrative	Region	
By	1990,	the	final	draft	of	the	Hong	Kong	basic	law	was	published	and	adopted	by	
the	PRC’s	National	People’s	Congress.	The	text	of	the	final	draft	did	not	differ	greatly	from	
what	had	previously	been	outlined	in	the	Sino-British	Joint	Declaration	or	by	Deng	
Xiaoping	and	Ye	Jianying.	Though	the	HKSAR	was	considered	an	“inalienable	part	of	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China,”	the	HKSAR	was	allowed	to	exercise	a	high	degree	of	autonomy,	
and	have	independent	executive,	legislative,	and	judicial	power.47	The	first	chapter,	on	the	
general	principles,	discussed	many	of	the	overarching	ideas	that	were	the	basis	of	the	
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HKSAR.	On	the	subject	of	legislative	powers,	the	legislature	was	required	to	be	composed	of	
permanent	residents	of	Hong	Kong,	and	the	laws	they	passed	would	be	valid,	so	long	as	
they	did	not	contradict	the	Basic	Law.	Furthermore,	any	previous	laws	in	Hong	Kong	would	
be	maintained,	so	long	as	they	did	not	go	against	Basic	Law.48	The	Basic	Law	formally	
declared	the	intent	to	continue	the	capitalist	system	and	way	of	life	for	50	years,	including	a	
note	on	protection	of	right	to	private	property.49	One	additional	provision	in	the	first	
chapter	of	the	Basic	Law	included	the	use	of	regional	flag	and	emblem.	Apart	from	the	
PRC’s	own	national	flag	and	national	emblem,	the	HKSAR	was	given	the	right	to	use	a	
regional	flag	and	regional	emblem.50	This	differed	from	the	special	regions	already	in	
existence,	who	were	not	granted	the	ability	to	have	their	own	flag	and	emblem.	The	use	of	a	
regional	flag	and	emblem	set	the	HKSAR	apart	from	any	other	economic	region	that	the	
PRC	had	set	up,	seemingly	to	further	the	“high	degree”	of	autonomy.	
The	2nd	chapter,	on	the	relationship	between	the	PRC’s	Central	Government	and	the	
HKSAR,	expanded	on	the	first	of	the	general	principles	–	the	principle	that	the	HKSAR	was	
an	inalienable	part	of	the	PRC.	Basic	Law	declared	that	the	Central	Government	would	be	
responsible	for	foreign	affairs	relation	to	the	HKSAR	(although	the	HKSAR	was	authorized	
to	conduct	“relevant	external	affairs”	on	its	own),	as	well	as	the	defense	of	the	region	
(although	the	HKSAR	was	responsible	for	maintaining	public	order).51	Additionally,	
military	forces	would	be	stationed	by	the	Central	Government	in	the	HKSAR,	but	they	
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would	not	interfere	in	local	affairs	(unless	the	HKSAR	asked	the	Central	Government	for	
assistance	in	public	order	and	disaster	relief	matters).52	
This	chapter	of	the	Basic	Law	also	briefly	expanded	on	the	details	of	the	executive,	
legislative,	and	judicial	powers	of	the	HKSAR,	though	each	branch	would	continue	to	be	
developed	more	fully	in	later	chapters.	Though	the	general	principles	chapter	stated	that	
the	HKSAR	executive	branch	would	have	to	be	made	of	permanent	residents,	article	15	of	
the	Basic	Law	stated	that	“The	Central	People’s	Government	shall	appoint	the	Chief	
Executive	and	the	principal	officials	of	the	executive	authorities	of	the	Hong	Kong	Special	
Administrative	Region…”53	On	the	subject	of	the	laws,	the	legislation	passed	was	required	
to	be	reported	to	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	PRC’s	National	People’s	Congress.	If	the	
Standing	Committee	deemed	a	law	to	not	in	conformity	with	Basic	Law’s	provisions	on	the	
responsibilities	and	relationship	of	the	Central	Government,	then	the	law	was	to	be	
returned	and	immediately	invalidated.54	Essentially,	the	Standing	Committee	had	final	say	
over	the	laws	that	could	be	passed.	The	courts	were	granted	jurisdiction	over	all	cases	in	
the	HKSAR,	and	were	given	completely	independent	power,	able	to	make	final	decisions	–	
where	the	legislature	did	not	have	full	control	in	the	end,	the	judicial	branch	was	seemingly	
intended	to	have	full	control.55	
One	of	the	key	concerns	in	the	discussion	of	the	executive	branch	was	that	it	would	
have	to	be	filled	with	permanent	residents.	Article	24	of	the	Basic	Law	went	into	detail	on	
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the	definition	of	a	permanent	resident,	which	included	Chinese	nationals	born	in	Hong	
Kong	before	or	after	the	establishment	of	the	HKSAR;	Chinese	nationals	who	had	lived	in	
Hong	Kong	at	least	seven	years	before	or	after	the	creation	of	the	HKSAR;	and	perhaps	one	
that	is	a	little	shocking,	people	who	are	not	Chinese,	but	legally	entered	Hong	Kong	and	
have	lived	there	for	at	least	seven	years.56	All	of	these	permanent	residents	would	have	the	
right	to	vote,	stand	for	election,	basic	freedoms	of	speech,	press,	association.	Additionally,	
trade	unions	and	striking	was	permitted	by	these	articles.57	
The	4th	chapter	of	the	Basic	Law	laid	out,	in	depth,	the	rules	and	powers	regarding	
the	political	structure	of	the	HKSAR.	The	Chief	Executive	of	the	HKSAR	was	designated	as	
the	head	of	the	region	and	would	represent	it.	The	Chief	Executive	had	to	be	a	Chinese	
citizen	at	least	40	years	old,	who	had	lived	in	Hong	Kong	for	at	least	20	years,	and	could	be	
chosen	through	one	of	two	methods.	The	first	was	by	direct	election	by	the	population	of	
the	HKSAR;	the	second	method	was	that	the	Central	Government	would	hold	consultations	
locally	and	then	appoint	someone	to	the	office.	In	practice,	the	Chief	Executive	holds	a	very	
similar	role	to	the	United	States	president.	They	placed	democratic	constraints	on	the	
office,	as	the	Chief	Executive	could	not	serve	more	than	two	5-year	terms.58	The	Chief	
Executive	had	the	power	to	sign	and	implement	laws	passed	by	the	Legislative	Council.	The	
office	could	also	appoint	and	remove	judges	and	holders	of	public	office.	They	had	the	
power	to	conduct	external	affairs	as	much	as	the	Central	Government	had	allowed.59	Along	
with	these	powers,	the	Chief	Executive	also	had	the	power	of	a	veto,	which	could	be	
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exercised	more	than	once	on	the	same	bill	or	budget.60	Similar	to	the	US	Presidential	
Cabinet,	the	Chief	Executive	of	the	HKSAR	had	an	Executive	Council	which	was	filled	with	
Hong	Kong	politicians	that	the	Chief	Executive	appointed.61	
The	Legislative	Council,	like	the	office	of	the	Chief	Executive,	had	to	be	composed	of	
Chinese	citizens	who	are	permanent	residents	of	the	HKSAR.	A	provision	was	made	for	
permanent	residents	who	were	not	Chinese	to	also	be	elected	to	the	Legislative	Council,	
provided	that	the	proportion	of	non-Chinese	members	did	not	exceed	20	percent	of	the	
total	number	of	legislators.62	The	Legislative	Council	was	granted	the	power	to	enact,	
amend,	or	repeal	laws	and	budgets.	Additionally,	the	Council	would	serve	as	a	body	for	
Hong	Kong	residents	to	voice	complaints.63	
The	Judicial	branch	was	appointed	by	the	Chief	Executive	and	served	to	preside	over	
and	make	decisions	in	both	criminal	and	civil	trials	in	the	region.	As	mentioned	above,	the	
judiciary	was	granted	the	power	of	final	adjudication,	free	from	any	interference.64	The	
highest	positions	in	the	judicial	system,	the	Chief	Justice	of	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal,	and	
the	Chief	Judge	of	the	High	Court	of	the	HKSAR,	had	to	be	Chinese	citizens	who	were	
permanent	residents.	65This	was	continuing	the	trend	we	see	within	the	political	structure	
of	the	importance	of	the	permanent	residents	participating	in	their	own	government.	
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The	economic	structure	was	to	be	kept	the	same	as	it	had	been	under	British	
control.	The	HKSAR	was	allowed	to	have	wholly	independent	finances,	and	any	revenue	
collected	would	not	be	handed	over	to	the	Central	Government,	nor	would	the	Central	
Government	levy	taxes	in	the	HKSAR.66	Instead,	the	HKSAR	would	practice	an	independent	
taxation	system,	and	would	enact	their	own	laws	and	policies	regarding	that.	Hong	Kong	
would	be	allowed	to	maintain	its	own	currency,	the	Hong	Kong	dollar.67	Hong	Kong	would	
be	allowed	to	continue	as	a	free	port	and	maintain	policies	of	free	trade.68	In	an	economic	
sense,	Hong	Kong	was	allowed	to	be	almost	entirely	free	from	the	PRC’s	control.	
 Patten’s	Reforms	
In	1992,	Chris	Patten	became	the	last	governor	of	Hong	Kong.	From	the	beginning,	
Patten	indicated	that	he	saw	it	as	his	responsibility	to	stand	for	Hong	Kong	and	enact	
legislation	that	would	ensure	the	territory	could	survive	in	its	retrocession	future.69	He	was	
determined	to	see	that	Hong	Kong’s	own	interests	would	not	be	ignored	during	
retrocession.	During	an	annual	address,	Patten	stated	that	he	wanted	to	“broaden	
democracy	through	a	coherent	package	that	he	was	prepared	vigorously	to	defend	and	
argue	for	in	Peking.”70	Though	the	draft	Basic	Law	provided	for	the	opportunity	of	
democracy,	Patten	was	concerned	that	not	implementing	policies	to	provide	for	a	greater	
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measure	of	democracy	prior	to	retrocession	would	risk	the	people	of	Hong	Kong	falling	
prey	to	outsiders,	and	becoming	pawns	of	greater	forces71.		
To	carry	out	the	plan,	he	began	to	devise	a	method	to	propose	changes	to	the	
Legislative	Council,	to	ensure	that	at	least	a	partial	representative	government	was	
installed	before	1997.	Patten’s	proposal	would	directly	impact	the	1995	elections,	allowing	
for	Hong	Kong	residents	to	vote	for	20	of	60	Legislative	Council	seats.	An	additional	30	
seats	would	then	be	left	to	be	voted	on	by	all	working	residents.	Patten’s	proposal	would	
further	democratize	the	territory	by	lowering	the	voting	age	from	21	to	18	and	requiring	
that	lower	level	boards	and	municipal	councils	would	be	directly	elected	as	opposed	to	
being	appointed,	which	had	been	the	case	up	to	this	point.	Furthermore,	the	remaining	10	
seats	of	the	Legislative	Council	would	be	filled	with	members	elected	by	an	Election	
Committee,	which	would	be	formed	out	of	those	serving	in	the	lower	level	boards	and	
councils.72	Essentially,	Patten’s	proposal	would	allow	for	the	people	of	Hong	Kong	to	
directly	or	indirectly	all	Legislative	Council	members	in	the	1995	elections,	and	it	would	
“shift	the	balance	of	power	from	the	Governor	and	his	Executive	Council	to	the	fully	
representative	Legislative	Council.”73		
This	proposal	was	met	with	charges	from	Beijing	that	the	British	had	betrayed	the	
agreements	from	both	sides	to	honor	Basic	Law	and	“were	set	on	instituting	democracy	by	
stealth.”74	They	denounced	the	plan	and	called	it	a	violation	of	the	Joint	Declaration	and	the	
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Basic	Law.	This	reaction	from	the	Chinese	government	was	largely	founded	in	a	basic	
distrust	of	the	British	and	lack	of	familiarity	with	the	idea	of	democracy.	Having	been	an	
entirely	communist	one-party	state	for	several	decades,	the	concept	of	democracy	was	
foreign	to	the	PRC,	and	combining	that	with	the	innate	lack	of	trust	they	had	in	the	British,	
due	to	past	history,	the	immediate	Chinese	reaction	to	the	British	propositions	on	
democracy	was	fear	and	anger.	This	had	gone	as	far	to	the	Chinese	suspecting	the	British	of	
a	conspiracy	to	undermine	Chinese	sovereignty	and	“spread	the	virus	of	democracy	to	the	
mainland.”75	The	British	government	responded	by	claiming	that	Patten’s	ideas	fit	into	the	
framework	based	on	the	Joint	Declaration,	and	that	discussion	with	the	PRC	government	
was	still	on	the	table.76	Indeed	it	still	was,	as	China	and	the	UK	entered	into	negotiations	
over	the	electoral	system	for	the	upcoming	1995	election.77		
Though	the	immediate,	and	semi-sudden	democratic	reforms	polarized	the	territory	
on	the	scope	and	pace	of	democratization,	the	results	of	the	1991	and	1995	elections	
indicated	that	the	Hong	Kongese	were	in	full	support	of	democracy.	In	fact,	the	Tiananmen	
Square	massacre	was	a	driving	factor	at	the	turn	of	the	decade	for	pro-democracy	forces.	In	
1991,	out	of	18	contested	seats,	the	pro-democracy	candidates	won	16,	while	in	1995,	
groups	and	candidates	in	the	pro-democracy	movement	saw	greater	support,	and	many	
pro-China	candidates	were	defeated	in	the	elections.78		
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The	talks	were	eventually	unsuccessful,	collapsing	at	the	end	of	1993,	but	Patten’s	
proposals	succeeded.	The	Hong	Kong	government	went	forth	with	Patten’s	original	ideas,	
and	in	1995	the	new	Legislative	Council	was	formed	in	accordance	with	those	ideas.79	This	
greatly	angered	the	Chinese	government,	which	responded	with	a	declaration	that	the	
fully-elected	Legislative	Council	would	be	dissolved	once	the	HKSAR	was	formed,	and	it	
would	be	replaced	with	a	“provisional”	legislature	whose	members	would	be	hand-picked	
by	Beijing.	
 China’s	Response	to	Reforms	
In	1993,	the	PRC	began	to	put	in	place	the	system	that	would	dismantle	the	
democratic	reformations	to	the	Hong	Kong	government.	As	a	direct	response	to	the	dispute	
with	the	British,	China	appointed	57	members	to	a	“Preliminary	Working	Committee”	
(PWC)	for	the	HKSAR	Preparatory	Committee,	ahead	of	the	formal	start	date	for	the	
Preparatory	Committee,	which	was	scheduled	to	start	work	in	1996.80	The	PWC	was	
created	for	the	purpose	of	abolishing	the	democratic	reforms,	and	the	Basic	Law	did	not	
have	a	provision	for	the	establishment	of	the	body.	The	groups	that	made	up	the	PWC	
suggested	to	the	PRC	that	an	alternative	political	body	to	the	Legislative	Council	should	be	
created	and	could	take	over	for	a	year	until	elections	in	line	with	China’s	interpretation	of	
the	Basic	Law	could	be	held	in	1998.	The	National	People’s	Congress	Standing	Committee	
of	the	PRC	adopted	the	suggestion,	and	“resolved	unanimously	to	dismantle	Hong	Kong’s	
existing	Legislative	Council	on	1	July	1997.”81	
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In	January	1996	the	150-person	HKSAR	Preparatory	Committee	was	established	
with	the	task	to	form	the	first	HKSAR	government.	Among	the	responsibilities	of	such	a	
task,	the	Preparatory	Committee	had	to	create	a	400-person	Selection	Committee	for	the	
purpose	of	recommending	a	candidate	for	Chief	Executive	to	the	PRC’s	central	government,	
as	well	as	lay	out	a	specific	method	for	forming	the	“first”	Legislative	Council.82	Unlike	the	
PWC,	there	were	provisions	in	the	Basic	Law	that	defined	the	creation	of	the	Preparatory	
Committee,	which	left	no	room	to	question	the	legitimacy	of	the	organization.	Despite	the	
large	majority	of	the	Preparatory	Committee	being	Hong	Kongese	(of	the	150	total	
members,	56	were	mainlanders,	94	were	Hong	Kongese),	those	who	sat	on	the	Committee	
were	largely	pro-China,	or	powerful	business	tycoons.	Members	of	the	democratic	party,	or	
the	democracy	movement,	were	completely	cut	out	of	the	Committee.83		
A	few	months	after	the	establishment	of	the	Preparatory	Committee,	the	
organization	voted	to	set	up	a	provisional	legislature	made	of	appointed	individuals,	to	
replace	the	existing	Legislative	Council.	Patten	responded	negatively	to	this,	denouncing	it	
as	a	violation	of	Basic	Law,	just	as	China	had	denounced	his	proposals	in	a	similar	way	
previously.	Patten	called	that	day	a	“black	day	for	democracy.”84	The	Preparatory	
Committee	also	established	the	Selection	Committee,	which	(as	expected)	strongly	favored	
pro-Beijing	candidates	with	a	business	background.	Thousands	applied	to	join	the	400-
person	Selection	Committee,	mostly	elites	from	the	various	sectors	of	the	Hong	Kong	
society,	but	despite	this,	the	majority	of	the	population	had	little	confidence	in	the	
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Preparatory	Committee	as	it	failed	to	consult	the	Hong	Kongese.85	At	the	end	of	1996,	the	
Selection	Committee	chose	the	first	Chief	Executive	of	the	HKSAR.	Tung	Chee-hwa,	a	
shipping	magnate,	was	a	surprising	choice,	considering	his	background.	Tung	had	been	
appointed	to	the	Executive	Council	by	Patten,	and	had	experience	working	with	not	only	
mainland	China,	but	Taiwan	and	the	West	as	well.86	
Less	than	two	weeks	following	the	selection	of	the	Chief	Executive,	the	Selection	
Committee	chose	60	people	to	serve	on	the	provisional	legislature.	The	decision	to	replace	
the	popularly	elected	Legislative	Council	with	an	appointed	one	was	met	with	intense	
controversy.	Altering	the	composition	of	the	Legislative	Council	raised	many	concerns	
about	the	legality	and	legitimacy	of	a	provisional	legislature,	as	neither	Basic	Law	nor	the	
Joint	Declaration	mentioned	any	interim	body.	In	fact,	the	Annexes	of	the	Basic	Law	text	
explicitly	provide	for	specific	methods	to	form	the	first	HKSAR	legislature,	which	should	
have	rendered	the	existence	of	the	Selection	Committee	null	and	void.	Furthermore,	though	
Deng	Xiaoping	saw	“one	country,	two	systems”	as	a	primarily	economic	system,	both	the	
Joint	Declaration	and	the	Basic	Law	made	provisions	that	promised	self-rule	to	the	Hong	
Kongese.	As	pro-democracy	activists	represented	a	majority	of	the	Hong	Kong	public,	their	
exclusion	from	the	Preparatory	and	Selection	Committees	cast	doubt	on	the	meaning	of	
“one	country,	two	systems,”	the	promised	“high	degree	of	autonomy,”	and	the	credibility	of	
the	PRC	government.	The	Chinese	were	essentially	reversing	the	earlier	democratic	
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reforms,	and	according	to	many	Western	interpretations	of	Basic	Law,	they	violated	the	
“spirit”	of	Basic	Law	as	well.87	
 The	Hong	Kong	Government	
As	Basic	Law	was	being	drafted,	China	continuously	assured	the	UK	and	Hong	Kong	
that	Hong	Kong’s	existing	systems	would	remain	mostly	unchanged	for	at	least	50	years	
after	retrocession.	This	promise	was	made,	in	part,	to	gain	the	confidence	of	the	Hong	
Kongese	in	PRC	rule,	but	it	also	served	to	reflect	the	PRC’s	unwillingness	to	allow	radical	
change	in	the	existing	systems	either	before	or	after	the	handover.	The	PRC,	for	the	most	
part,	favored	the	existing	model	in	Hong	Kong,	where	democracy	did	not	reign	prior	to	
Patten’s	reforms.	The	PRC	preferred	the	system	in	which	there	were	appointed	leaders,	
loyal	to	a	larger	body	(pre-retrocession,	the	British,	post-retrocession,	the	PRC),	but	that	
still	allowed	a	free	capitalist	economy.88		
When	the	handover	occurred,	the	PRC	did	follow	what	was	set	out	by	the	Basic	Law,	
though	what	they	set	up	was	in	line	with	their	interpretation	–	a	key	thing	to	note	in	
understanding	whether	the	PRC	violated	Basic	Law	from	the	start.	As	a	result,	the	
government	created	was	in	line	with	the	PRC’s	favored	idea	of	maintaining	the	colonial	
status	quo.	The	Basic	Law	set	up	an	executive-dominated	government,	with	a	weak	
legislature	that	had	limited	democratic	representation.	The	Chief	Executive	is	the	head	of	
the	system,	enjoying	powerful	executive	powers,	including	power	over	the	courts	and	
representation	of	the	region	of	the	HKSAR.	“Hong	Kong	people	ruling	Hong	Kong”	did	not	
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mean	full	democratic	self-rule	to	the	PRC.	Instead,	their	interpretation	of	that	principle	was	
in	the	policy	that	the	Hong	Kong	SAR	government	would	have	to	be	composed	of	local	
inhabitants.	The	difference	between	the	Chief	Executive,	though,	and	the	Governor	before	
them,	was	that	the	PRC	would	be	selecting	a	Hong	Kongese	person	loyal	to	them.	
The	Chief	Executive,	as	outlined	by	the	Basic	Law,	had	overwhelming	power	over	
the	legal	process.	They	are	responsible	for	implementing	the	Basic	Law,	along	will	any	
other	laws	the	Legislative	Council	passes.	The	Chief	Executive	also	is	allowed	to	guide	
government	policy	and	issue	executive	orders.	They	also	have	complete	control	over	the	
judges	of	the	courts,	being	allowed	to	appoint	judges	at	all	levels.	These	powers	combined	
create	a	position	of	incredible	strength.	The	laws	and	policies	are	subject	to	the	whims	and	
interpretations	of	the	Chief	Executive,	who	is	only	accountable	to	the	PRC’s	central	
government,	which	placed	them	in	power.89		
The	Legislative	Council	is	partially	formed	from	a	semi-democracy,	with	
representatives	voting	on	behalf	of	a	constituency	(often	called	“functional	constituency”).	
Other	seats	in	the	council	were	initially	chosen	by	a	specially	created	election	committee.90	
The	main	powers	of	the	Legislative	Council	are	to	examine,	repeal,	enact,	and	amend	laws	
and	budgets,	but	the	passing	and	implementation	of	laws	is	subject	to	the	Chief	Executive’s	
agreement.	The	Chief	Executive	has	the	power	to	veto	laws,	and	even	dissolve	the	
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Legislative	Council	once	in	their	administration,	should	the	two	be	unable	to	agree	on	a	
particular	bill.91	
In	the	final	government	created,	and	implemented,	the	people	had	little	to	no	power.	
Though	the	PRC	could	argue	on	a	technicality	that	the	“functional	constituency”	and	fact	
that	the	Chief	Executive	had	to	be	from	Hong	Kong	meant	that	“functionally”	a	partial	
democracy	was	in	place,	in	reality	the	people	have	no	power	under	the	government.	The	
Chief	Executive	is	chosen	by	the	PRC,	instead	of	a	direct	democracy.	The	Legislative	Council	
is	formed	mostly	without	democracy.	The	Judiciary	is	entirely	under	the	control	of	the	Chief	
Executive,	who	is	in	turn	under	the	control	of	the	PRC’s	central	government.	
Through	exploring	the	creation	and	details	of	this	model,	one	concept	becomes	
particularly	noticeable	–	sovereignty.	The	implementation	of	“one	country,	two	systems,”	
creates	questions	as	to	what	the	model	means	for	sovereignty,	for	statehood,	when	the	
Basic	Law	appears	to	override	multiple	forms	of	sovereignty	while	Hong	Kong	in	reality	
seems	to	hold	some	forms	of	sovereignty.	In	the	West,	a	state	is	generally	understood	to	be	
a	region	with	defined	borders	with	a	government	that	governs	that	territory	specifically,	
and	with	a	few	exceptions,	state	and	nation	are	synonymous.	The	system	that	Hong	Kong	
exists	in,	however,	goes	against	these	ideas.	Hong	Kong	is	a	region	with	a	government	that	
governs	that	territory,	yet	it	does	not	have	statehood	in	the	understanding	of	a	country.	It	
“governs”	itself,	but	the	only	sense	of	international	recognition	comes	from	Hong	Kong’s	
active	role	in	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	and	the	Asia-Pacific	Economic	
Cooperation	(APEC),	as	well	as	numerous	other	international	organizations.	It	just	does	not	
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hold	a	seat	in	any	organizations	like	the	United	Nations.	So	perhaps	Hong	Kong	does	have	
international	legal	sovereignty	–	if	a	modified	form	of	it	–	but	it	is	still	not	its	own	state.	It	
has	a	“separate”	political	system,	economic	system,	and	judicial	system	from	mainland	
China.		
Hong	Kong	exists	as	essentially	an	economic	portal	for	direct	investment	in	the	PRC.	
During	the	British	Empire	era	Hong	Kong	established	itself	as	a	global	city,	and	as	the	PRC	
gradually	became	an	attractive	market	to	foreign	investors,	Hong	Kong	was	able	to	
advertise	itself	as	the	free	territory	through	which	companies	could	directly	invest	in	
mainland	China.	The	economic	power	Hong	Kong	gained	from	this	protected	it	through	its	
retrocession	to	the	PRC.	As	the	doorway	between	foreign	corporations	and	China,	Hong	
Kong	successfully	leveraged	their	economic	importance	in	order	to	secure	the	safety	of	
their	partial	international	legal	sovereignty,	which	was	perceived	by	China	as	instrumental	
to	maintaining	the	status	quo	and	the	best	opportunities	for	continued	economic	growth.	
Though	the	international	community	may	grant	recognition	to	a	state	or	region,	in	the	case	
of	Hong	Kong,	it	was	only	with	the	permission	of	the	PRC.	
The	economic	significance	of	Hong	Kong	also	heavily	influenced	the	creation	of	the	
semi-representative	government	not	fully	under	China’s	control.	Though	ultimately	the	
Hong	Kongese	have	little	to	no	influence	over	their	government,	a	small	part	of	the	
legislative	body	is	directly	elected,	and	the	judicial	system	was	kept	separate	from	China.	
The	recent	Hong	Kong	protests	were	in	direct	response	to	a	threat	to	that	independent	
judiciary.	As	the	extradition	bill	would	have	given	the	mainland	the	ability	to	suppress	
voices	of	political	dissent	in	Hong	Kong,	protestors	felt	that	the	judicial	system,	which	
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needed	to	be	independent	and	free	for	the	purposes	of	the	corporations	based	in	the	
territory,	was	weakening	and	bending	to	the	will	of	the	PRC.	
Earlier	this	year,	Hong	Kong	indicated	at	least	a	partial	presence	of	interdependent	
and	domestic	sovereignty	when	it	cut	off	train	lines,	cross-border	buses	and	ferries,	and	
reduced	flights	all	from	mainland	China	in	an	effort	to	reduce	the	spread	of	the	novel	
coronavirus.92	It	governs	itself,	and	enjoys	international	recognition	and	participation	in	
international	organizations,	though	not	at	the	same	level	as	recognized	states,	and	was	able	
to	all	but	closed	the	border	between	itself	and	mainland	China.	Despite	the	apparent	
presence	of	some	forms	of	sovereignty,	though,	this	is	a	relatively	modern	development.	As	
we	will	see	in	the	next	chapter,	Hong	Kong	has	developed	these	aspects	of	sovereignty	in	a	
vastly	different	way	than	what	has	occurred	in	Taiwan.	This	then	raises	the	question	of	
what	does	it	even	mean	to	have	sovereignty	under	this	model?		
In	examining	the	circumstances	under	which	the	one	country,	two	systems	model	
was	created,	we	learn	why	it	was	accepted,	and	the	effects	this	model	has	had	on	
sovereignty	in	Hong	Kong.	By	examining	the	initial	presentation	by	Ye	Jianying	and	Deng	
Xiaoping,	the	Joint	Declaration	from	1984,	the	Basic	Law	in	1991,	and	the	final	government	
installed	by	the	PRC	in	1997,	we	see	the	evolution	of	the	model,	and	how	it	has	changed	
from	the	vague	Nine	Points	Ye	Jianying	proposed	decades	ago.		
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 Taiwan	and	the	Battle	for	Sovereignty	
With	the	formulation	of	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	model,	the	PRC	developed	a	
proposal	for	reunification	with	Taiwan	that	was	strangely	generous	and	conciliatory.	The	
model,	which	would	have	allowed	Taiwan	to	essentially	continue	the	status	quo	minus	
formal	international	relations,	has	been	the	PRC’s	official	policy	on	reunification	for	several	
decades.	Despite	both	sides	engaging	in	talks	over	cross-strait	relations	for	decades,	
Taiwan	does	not	accept	this	model.	Hong	Kong	is	the	first	region	in	which	the	model	was	
fully	developed	and	implemented.	Since	Hong	Kong’s	retrocession	in	1997,	the	model	has	
been	seen	to	be	compromised,	both	in	ways	beneficial	and	detrimental	to	the	idea	of	the	
model.	These	complications,	which	revolve	around	the	four	dimensions	of	sovereignty,	are	
of	particular	importance	to	Taiwan,	which	has	existed	as	a	separate	government	on	its	own	
territory	for	over	half	a	century.		
Taiwan’s	history	has	been	closely	tied	to	ideas	of	democracy	and	international	
recognition.	Despite	the	martial	law	dictatorship	that	ruled	Taiwan	for	the	first	several	
decades	of	its	existence,	democracy	has	been	central	to	the	self-definition	of	the	Taiwanese	
people,	resulting	in	the	democratic	reforms	in	the	late	20th	century.	With	their	battle	for	
democracy	and	self-governance,	domestic	sovereignty	has	been	one	of	the	most	significant	
aspects	of	sovereignty	to	the	Taiwanese	people,	and	the	desire	to	protect	that	from	foreign	
influence	has	led	to	a	strong	refusal	of	unification	with	China.	International	recognition	has	
been	a	constant	battle	for	the	Taiwanese,	with	various	countries	switching	recognition	
away	from	or	toward	Taiwan.	With	international	recognition	being	considered	a	clear	
indicator	of	statehood,	Taiwan’s	commitment	to	the	battle	comes	as	no	surprise,	as	they	
have	fought	to	be	considered	the	true	Chinese	state.	
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In	examining	what	has	been	and	continues	to	be	vital	to	Taiwan,	a	focus	on	
economics	comes	across	as	particularly	important,	distinct	from	domestic	politics	and	
international	recognition	while	having	implications	for	both.	The	battles	between	Taiwan	
and	the	PRC	continue	to	rage	on,	but	the	dimension	has	switched	toward	a	focus	on	
economics.	With	the	PRC	adopting	more	capitalist	policies	with	the	opening	of	Special	
Economic	Zones	and	Hong	Kong’s	retrocession,	and	with	Taiwan	opening	to	mainland	
capital	in	the	1990s,	the	economies	of	the	two	sides	of	the	Taiwan	strait	have	become	
increasingly	intertwined.	As	economics	is	a	complex	broad	field,	trade	is	the	proxy	by	
which	we	will	analyze	the	extent	and	form	of	economic	integration.	In	examining	the	trade	
relationship,	we	can	explore	the	effects	of	Taiwanese	fixed	assets	in	the	PRC,	and	the	
potential	implications	of	them	on	this	relationship.	The	effects	of	this	entanglement	have	
led	to	doubts	of	Taiwanese	autonomy	and	whether	they	will	be	able	to	maintain	
Westphalian	sovereignty,	with	the	trend	of	economic	integration	creating	an	image	of	
scales	tipped	in	favor	of	the	PRC.		
 Domestic	Political	Control	
In	order	to	explain	the	importance	of	domestic/westphalian	sovereignty	to	the	
Taiwanese,	we	must	first	go	back	and	understand	how	Taiwan’s	government	has	evolved	
since	the	Nationalist	Party	(KMT)	was	exiled	to	the	island	in	1949.	Though	the	KMT	and	its	
leader,	Chiang	Kai-Shek,	had	seemingly	been	champions	of	similar	liberal	values	to	the	
United	States,	upon	settling	in	Taiwan,	the	KMT	enacted	martial	law,	establishing	Chiang	as	
the	dictator.	From	their	arrival	in	1949	until	his	death	in	1975,	“Chiang	Kai-shek	ruled	
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Taiwan	with	an	iron	hand…”93	Every	aspect	of	the	government	was	controlled	by	a	single	
party	–	the	KMT,	which	was	initially	led	entirely	by	exiled	mainlanders,	unwavering	in	their	
support	of	the	party.	The	native	Taiwanese	were	allowed	to	create	a	provincial	government	
headed	by	a	Taiwanese	governor,	though	effectively	the	KMT	had	control	over	the	entire	
territory.	
Despite	education	at	a	Comintern-supported	institution	in	Moscow,	and	further	
reeducation	in	Confucianism	and	Nationalism,	Chiang	Kai-Shek’s	son,	Chiang	Ching-kuo,	
was	less	restrictive	than	his	father.	For	decades,	any	party	in	opposition	to	the	KMT	was	
illegal,	but	towards	the	end	of	his	life,	Chiang	Ching-Kuo	worked	towards	the	liberalization	
and	democratization	of	Taiwan.94	The	first	major	step	in	this	transformation	occurred	in	
1986,	when	Chiang	allowed	independence-oriented	opposition	groups	to	form	the	
Democratic	Progressive	Party	(DPP),	which	was	allowed	to	take	part	in	the	first	free	
parliamentary	elections	at	the	end	of	that	year.		
The	“Communist	rebellion,”	or	so	it	was	called	by	the	ruling	KMT,	had	caused	
multiple	problems	for	the	KMT’s	Republic	of	China	government	–	particularly	in	the	
legislative	bodies.	Their	constitutional	court,	the	Council	of	Grand	Justices,	granted	
delegates	elected	to	the	Legislative	Yuan	lifelong	terms	in	office.	Over	the	decades	that	
followed,	there	were	over	300	cases	in	which	the	elected	delegates	died,	and	their	seats	
were	filled	with	the	runners-up	in	the	elections	that	had	occurred	on	the	mainland	in	
1947.95	By	the	end	of	the	1980s,	Taiwan	had	a	“self-perpetuating”	parliament	consisting	
largely	of	elderly	mainland	Chinese.	The	elections	in	1986	gave	seats	to	the	new	young	
 
93	Willem	Van	Kemenade,	China,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	Inc.	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1998),	105.	
94	Van	Kemenade,	China,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	Inc.,	105.	
95	Van	Kemenade,	China,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	Inc.,	106.	
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members	of	the	DPP,	whose	main	objective	was	to	force	out	the	old	KMT	delegates.	This	led	
to	disaster	during	the	following	parliamentary	session,	as	“parliamentary	procedures	
frequently	deteriorated	into	violent	clashes…”96	
Chiang	Ching-kuo	died	in	1988,	and	was	succeeded	by	Lee	Teng-hui,	who	had	been	
elected	as	vice	president	shortly	before.	Lee	Teng-hui	came	from	a	wildly	different	
background	than	the	Chiang	family	or	many	of	the	older	KMT	members.	Lee	was	born	to	a	
native	Taiwanese	farmer	and	received	his	education	in	Japan	and	the	United	States.	He	
grew	up	with	no	attachment	to	the	mainland,	being	a	product	of	the	Japanese	occupation.	
Lee	only	began	learning	Mandarin	after	becoming	an	adult	and	made	no	attempt	to	hide	
that	he	spoke	better	Japanese	than	Mandarin.97	In	the	early	years	of	his	administration,	Lee	
worked	within	the	rules	and	safety	of	the	KMT’s	old	guard.	In	1990,	however,	Lee	began	to	
change.	
Playing	to	the	KMT	party,	which	was	still	in	charge	of	the	presidential	elections,	Lee	
campaigned	on	the	idea	that	“Taiwan	and	the	mainland	would	be	reunified	within	six	
years…”98	Lee’s	mention	of	six	years	is	notable,	as	that	would	“coincidentally”	end	up	
aligning	with	the	next	election.	This	campaign	led	Lee	to	victory	in	the	party,	though	once	
again	the	age	of	the	electors	was	noted.99	Immediately	after	this	election,	Lee	took	a	new	
direction,	embarking	on	a	journey	towards	a	revolution	of	the	KMT	political	structure.	This	
new	campaign	pushed	the	structure	in	direction	of	a	new	state,	as	opposed	to	a	
government-in-exile.	Despite	objection	from	the	DPP,	Lee	appointed	the	state’s	senior	
 
96	Van	Kemenade,	China,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	Inc.,	106.	
97	Van	Kemenade,	China,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	Inc.,	107.	
98	Van	Kemenade,	China,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	Inc.,	108.	
99	Many	of	the	delegates	had	to	be	carried	to	the	ballot	box,	and	one	of	the	electors	ranted	about	voting	for	
Chiang	Kai-shek	“as	always.”	Another	delegate	was	101	years	old.	
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mainlander	general	as	the	premier.	This	was	not	to	further	cement	the	KMT’s	hold	over	
Taiwan’s	politics,	though.	Lee’s	next	move,	which	was	supported	by	the	Council	of	Grand	
Justices,	called	for	all	members	of	the	National	Assembly	who	had	lifelong	terms	to	resign	
before	the	end	of	1991.100	Lee	followed	this	up	by	revoking	all	the	“emergency	legislation	
that	had	provide	the	constitutional	basis	for	the	existence	of	the	‘Republic	of	China’	in	
Taiwan.”101	The	purpose	was	to	pave	the	way	for	a	series	of	elections	for	new	
representative	bodies	which	would	not	claim	to	cover	all	of	China.	The	Taiwanese	would	
now	directly	elect	most	members	of	the	National	Assembly,	the	Legislative	Yuan,	and	the	
Control	Yuan.	
The	first	elections	for	a	Legislative	Yuan	representing	only	Taiwan	saw	the	KMT	
vote	drop	sharply,	to	roughly	53%,	meanwhile	the	DPP’s	vote	rose	to	31%.102	With	the	
increased	power	of	the	DPP,	Lee	Teng-hui	fired	the	mainlander	premier,	and	installed	a	
Taiwanese-born	politician.	This	action	led	to	a	schism	in	the	KMT	during	the	party	congress	
in	1993.	Younger	members	founded	the	New	Party	in	opposition	to	Lee’s	new	direction,	
concerned	that	he	was	leading	them	towards	independence,	instead	of	reunification.	With	
these	new	reforms	came	a	sensitive	question	–	should	the	governor	of	the	‘province	of	
Taiwan’	and	the	president	be	elected	directly	by	the	people?	Originally,	the	governor	was	
appointed	by	the	president,	and	the	president	was	approved	by	the	National	Assembly.	
This	led	to	many	crises,	as	the	answer	to	that	question	could	completely	change	what	
Taiwan	was	–	if	the	president	were	directly	elected,	could	they	call	themselves	the	
president	of	the	Republic	of	China?	Would	the	Republic	still	exist	if	that	happened?	Despite	
 
100	The	National	Assembly	is	equivalent	to	the	US’	electoral	college.	
101	Van	Kemenade,	China,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	Inc.,	109.	
102	Van	Kemenade,	China,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	Inc.,	110.	
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all	the	uncertainty	surrounding	this	question,	constitutional	redrafting	led	to	the	decision	
to	hold	a	direct	gubernatorial	election	at	the	end	of	1994,	and	a	direct	election	for	president	
in	1996.103	
After	exploring	the	process	and	time	it	took	for	Taiwan	to	achieve	democracy,	it	is	
understandable	why	the	Taiwanese	would	feel	the	need	to	protect	this	democracy.	Though	
the	PRC’s	proposal	to	Taiwan	would	allow	them	to	essentially	operate	independent	from	
the	Central	government,	Taiwan	had	no	guarantee	that	would	remain	true.	The	British-Sino	
Joint	Declaration	had	intended	to	give	democratic	rule	to	Hong	Kong,	and	Basic	Law	
attempted	to	embody	that	the	best	it	could.	Hong	Kong’s	last	governor	even	instituted	
democratic	reforms	in	the	few	years	leading	up	to	retrocession.	The	reality	of	Hong	Kong’s	
politics,	however,	shows	a	government	subservient	to	the	PRC,	and	under	extensive	CCP	
control,	rather	than	control	by	Hong	Kong’s	people.	Over	the	past	three	decades,	
democracy	has	become	an	integral	part	of	the	Taiwanese	political	structure,	and	who	they	
are	as	a	state	and	a	people.	Many	in	Taiwan	fear	that	joining	the	PRC	would	mean	
potentially	losing	their	democracy.	Though	Lee	did	believe	that	no	government	could	truly	
ask	its	citizens	to	give	up	the	economic,	social,	and	political	progress	they	had	fought	so	
hard	to	make	happen,	he	did	not	think	the	PRC	was	necessarily	above	doing	exactly	that.104	
Despite	the	PRC’s	official	proposal	allowing	Taiwan	near	full	independence,	the	PRC	
continues	to	“insist	that	they	had	the	right	to	use	force	to	impose	conditions	for	how	
Taiwan	should	be	governed	under	their	rule.”105		
 
103	Van	Kemenade,	China,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	Inc.,	111.	
104	Lee	Teng-hui,	“China’s	Future,”	National	Review	(1996),	26.	
105	Lee,	“China’s	Future,”	27.	
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From	the	beginning,	Lee	Teng-hui	believed	in	a	separate	Taiwanese	state.	He	was	
not	explicitly	in	support	of	declaring	independence,	nor	was	he	against	unification.	He	
believed	that	Taiwan	was	“an	independent,	sovereign	country,”106	but	also	that	“Taiwan	
and	the	mainland	are	indivisible	parts	of	China’s	territory…”107	The	era	of	Lee	Teng-hui	is	
where	we	truly	begin	to	see	a	difference	in	conceptions	of	sovereignty,	jurisdiction,	and	
statehood.	Prior	to	his	administration,	Taiwan	had	been	rather	clear	on	its	perceptions	of	
China	and	the	two	governing	bodies	fighting	for	control	in	it.	That	is,	KMT	leaders	believed	
Taiwan,	the	Republic	of	China,	was	the	sole	legitimate	government	of	all	China,	including	
the	mainland.	Lee	worked	to	change	this	view,	and	in	1991	he	was	successful.	With	
constitutional	reform,	the	establishment	of	the	National	Unification	Guidelines,	and	the	end	
of	the	“Period	of	national	mobilization	for	suppression	of	the	communist	rebellion,”	Lee	
was	able	to	shift	the	government	toward	a	view	recognizing	“the	fact	that	two	equal	
political	entities	exist	in	two	independent	areas	of	one	country.”108	The	wording	conflicts	
slightly	with	his	earlier	statement	in	1989	declaring	Taiwan	an	independent	state,	but	his	
view	was	clear.	The	Taiwanese	and	mainland	governments	were	on	equal	standing,	
presiding	over	separate	areas	of	a	single	country.	Unlike	the	PRC,	who	regarded	Taiwan	as	
a	“renegade	province,”	Lee	believed	“one	China”	meant	the	people,	not	the	land.109	In	a	
sense,	his	perception	of	the	Taiwan/China	conflict	was	one	where	one	country,	two	
systems	already	existed	–	just	not	as	the	PRC	had	intended.	
 
106	J.	Bruce	Jacobs	and	I-hao	Ben	Liu,	“Lee	Teng-hui	and	the	Idea	of	‘Taiwan,’”	The	China	Quarterly	190	(June	
2007),	380.	
107	Jacobs	and	Liu,	“Lee	Teng-hui	and	the	Idea	of	‘Taiwan,’”	381.	
108	Jacobs	and	Liu,	“Lee	Teng-hui	and	the	Idea	of	‘Taiwan,’”	382.	
109	Lee	Teng-hui,	“Understanding	Taiwan,”	Foreign	Affairs	78,	no.6	(December	1999),	10.	
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Lee’s	idea	of	“one	China”	as	the	people	was	a	recurring	theme	throughout	his	
presidency	and	was	an	underlying	idea	in	many	of	his	reforms	in	the	1990s.	Whereas	the	
PRC	emphasized	an	idea	based	on	the	existing	country,	and	encouraged	“love	of	the	
country	and	nation,”	Lee	was	focused	on	the	idea	of	cultural	regeneration.	110	He	favored	a	
new	Chinese	culture	in	Taiwan,	with	a	basis	in	both	Chinese	heritage,	as	well	as	the	new	
Western	democracy	and	economic	freedoms	that	he	had	helped	develop	in	Taiwan.111	This	
new	perception	of	China,	and	the	people,	along	with	the	reforms	he	championed,	led	Lee	to	
promote	the	concept	of	popular	sovereignty.	Though	his	1996	Inaugural	Address	does	not	
clearly	define	what	popular	sovereignty	meant,	the	new	era	Lee	describes	comes	in	the	
aftermath	of	the	successful	implementation	of	democracy	in	Taiwan.	He	suggests	that	
popular	sovereignty	occurs	when	a	leader	responds	to	the	wishes	of	the	people.	“Whatever	
the	people	desire	is	always	in	my	heart.”112	This	line	from	his	inaugural	speech	embodies	
the	spirit	of	what	popular	sovereignty	meant	to	Lee,	and	ultimately,	it	appears	that	that	
form	of	sovereignty,	precious	to	democracies,	was	important	to	him	as	the	guiding	light	in	
how	Taiwan	should	move	forward	in	policy.	
In	one	writing,	Lee	articulated	one	of	his	main	problems	with	the	PRC’s	proposal	
that	he	thought	was	severely	damaging	to	unification	in	the	first	place.	Though	not	outright	
naming	the	model,	Lee	states	that	the	“mainland	authorities	disingenuously	argue	that	
reunification	has	nothing	to	do	with	the	differences	in	socioeconomic	and	political	systems	
between	the	two	sides.”113	“One	country,	two	systems”	proposes	a	model	in	which	the	
 
110	Li	Yixian,	“On	the	characteristics,	strong	points,	and	shortcomings	of	education	in	Hong	Kong:	a	mainland	
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differences	should	not	entirely	matter,	but	Lee	believes	that	that	is	not	possible.	The	
differences	between	communism	and	capitalism	and	between	democracy	and	
authoritarianism	are	relevant	because	the	systems	do	not	come	across	as	entirely	
compatible.114	
The	concept	of	the	“Taiwan	Experience”	was	central	to	Lee’s	understanding	of	
Taiwan	as	a	state,	and	on	how	he	believed	Taiwan	should	conduct	its	negotiations	with	the	
PRC.	He	described	the	“Taiwan	Experience”	as	the	state’s	experience	in	implementing	Sun	
Yat-sen’s	Three	Principles	of	the	People:	freedom,	democracy,	and	equitable	distribution	of	
wealth.115	Lee	concedes	that	Taiwan’s	democracy	is	by	no	means	perfect,	and	has	flaws,	but	
he	sticks	to	his	point	that	they	are	on	the	path	towards	further	developing	and	
implementing	these	principles.	The	Taiwan	Experience	and	increasing	democratization	of	
Taiwan	reformed	their	state	to	the	point	where	Lee	considered	their	traditional	social	
values	to	be	gone.116	In	their	place,	Taiwan	began	to	“believe	that	freedom,	democracy,	and	
prosperity	have	become	[their]	most	valuable	and	powerful	assets.”117	
Lee’s	characterization	of	the	Taiwan	experience	also	starts	to	suggest	why	Taiwan	
resists	the	model	on	the	subject	of	international	recognition.	The	model	calls	for	Taiwan	to	
allow	the	PRC	to	be	the	sole	international	representative	of	all	of	China.	For	a	state	
dedicated	to	democracy	and	liberalism,	being	ruled	and	internationally	represented	by	an	
authoritarian	government	is	objectionable.	Lee	Teng-hui	knew	this,	noting	that	in	reality,	
“the	authoritarian	nature	of	the	communist	regime	is	the	key	factor	in	alienating	the	people	
 
114	This	is	something	that	comes	up	again	and	again	in	the	present	day	with	respect	to	China’s	rise	and	the	
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of	Taiwan	from	the	Chinese	mainland.”118	He	pointed	out	that	rather	than	the	government	
in	Taipei	moving	Taiwan	towards	independence,	it	was	actually	the	people	themselves	that	
pushed	in	that	direction.	Noting	the	1995-96	Crisis	as	evidence,	Lee	stated	that	“every	time	
the	authorities	in	Beijing	have	tried	to	intimidate	Taiwan	with	military	force,	the	
percentage	of	Taiwanese	voters	advocating	independence	has	increased.”119	
When	the	model,	initially	devised	as	Ye	Jianying’s	“Nine	Points,”	was	presented	in	
1981,	“Taiwan	rejected	the	‘Nine	Points’	with	‘Three	No’s’:	no	contact,	no	negotiations,	and	
no	compromise.”120	These	“Three	No’s”	were	later	developed	further	into	the	“Guidelines	
for	National	Unification	(1991),”	which	allowed	for	reunification	on	the	condition	of	“a	
consensus	on	democracy,	freedom,	and	the	equal	distribution	of	wealth,	which	should	be	
reached	on	the	basis	of	peace,	equality,	and	reciprocity	after	a	reasonable	period	of	
exchange,	cooperation,	and	consultation.”121	The	PRC’s	condition	for	“one	country,	two	
systems,”	asked	for	the	Taiwanese	government	to	bow	down	to	the	PRC’s	Central	
government.	Taiwan	was	less	than	accepting	of	this	but	notes	for	the	Guidelines	mentioned	
a	“one	county,	two	governments,”	so	long	as	the	separation	was	temporary	and	would	lead	
into	unification	like	Germany.		
Following	the	retreat	to	Taiwan,	the	KMT	worked	to	use	Chinese	nationalism	to	
legitimize	the	dictatorship,	but	by	the	1970s	diplomatic	isolation	had	worn	away	this	
nationalism.	By	the	late	1980s,	the	people	and	politicians	began	calling	for	educational	
reform.	From	taking	ideology	out	of	the	curriculum	to	instilling	a	Taiwanese	consciousness	
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in	the	younger	citizens,	the	demand	for	reform	received	strong	support	from	the	DPP	and	
even	some	parts	of	the	KMT.	The	new	educational	curriculum	moved	away	from	promoting	
“Chinese”	idealism,	instead	promoting	the	idea	of	the	“Taiwanese”	people.	Early	textbooks	
avoid	using	the	words	for	“Chinese”	in	either	a	political	or	ethnic	sense.	The	new	course	has	
seemingly	been	promoting	a	Taiwanese	national	identity,	which	threatens	what	the	KMT	
has	stood	for,	and	has	led	to	criticisms	claiming	that	the	new	curriculum	is	“eroding	
Taiwan’s	links	with	the	Chinese	mainland,	developing	a	terminology	to	‘de-sinicise’	Taiwan	
and	using	education	to	separate	the	people	of	Taiwan	from	Chinese	consciousness.”122	
The	education	reforms	coincided	with	change	in	both	political	structure	and	policy.	
As	mentioned	above,	Taiwan’s	policy	began	to	shift	with	the	introduction	of	the	
“Guidelines.”	Both	sides	of	the	Cross-Strait	conflict	at	the	time	endorsed	models	that	
promoted	two	different	systems	coexisting,	but	the	shared	idea	is	limited	only	to	the	
wording.	The	PRC,	as	has	previously	been	established,	promoted	a	system	which	gave	their	
Central	government	dominance.	The	temporary	goal	for	Taiwan	under	the	“Guidelines,”	
however,	was	for	coexisting	equal-standing	governments.	Under	the	PRC’s	model	and	
especially	in	a	form	similar	to	the	Hong	Kong	implementation,	Taiwan	would	not	enjoy	the	
levels	of	sovereignty	a	free	state	has.	It	would	not	have	full	independent	control	over	the	
local	government,	and	it	would	not	be	allowed	to	have	independent	foreign	relations	with	
other	countries.	Essentially,	it	would	not	be	a	state	created	and	governed	by	the	Taiwanese	
people.	Taiwan’s	unelaborated	idea,	however,	pleases	both	the	pro-unification	KMT	and	the	
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pro-independence	DPP.	Though	temporary,	the	state	would	theoretically	be	allowed	
complete	freedom,	as	an	independent	state	–	but	still	tied	to	the	Chinese	nation.		
 Economic	Sovereignty	
	“It	can	now	be	said	that	three	theorems	are	currently	working	toward	integrating	
the	two	sides	of	the	Taiwan	Strait.”123	Chien-min	Chao,	a	professor	at	Sun	Yat-sen	Graduate	
Institute,	published	an	article	in	the	early	2000s	that	outlined	three	existing	and	eventual	
connections	that	would	exist	between	Taiwan	and	the	mainland.	The	first	focused	on	
cultural	integration,	which	based	on	Lee’s	comments	on	“one	China”	could	be	argued	to	
already	exist	on	some	level.	Shared	ancestry,	language,	and	customs	are	some	of	the	
concepts	on	which	this	first	theorem	is	based,	and	China	and	Taiwan	continue	to	work	
toward	increasing	these	cultural	connections.	The	second	theorem	focused	on	an	economic	
dimension.	Based	on	the	history	of	the	European	Union	(EU)	and	its	effects	on	member	
countries,	scholars	formed	a	hypothesis	arguing	that	economic	integration	can	and	likely	
will	“ramify	and	generate	spillover	effects.”124	This	is	largely	based	in	the	idea	that	close	
economic	cooperation	could	potentially	erode	sovereignty	and	influence	political	decisions	
–	which	is	essentially	the	third	theorem.	As	the	third	political-based	theorem	is	heavily	
reliant	on	the	success	of	the	first	two	theorems,	we	must	examine	the	effects	of	these	
theorems,	particularly	the	economic	dimension	with	the	potential	legal	effects.		
Taiwan	and	the	mainland	have	had	some	form	of	an	economic	relationship	over	the	
past	few	decades,	and	during	that	time	their	economies	have	become	increasingly	
intertwined.	This	has	opened	the	door	to	a	new	perspective	on	sovereignty	and	governance	
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that	helps	explain	Taiwan’s	continuing	refusal	of	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	model	and	
apparent	avoidance	of	unification.	Though	some	scholars	have	presented	arguments	that	
economic	interdependence	with	China	would	give	Taiwan	political	leverage	and	“may	
reduce	the	risks	of	hostility,”	or	“make	the	Taiwanese	economy	more	valuable	to	the	
mainland,”	there	is	reason	to	be	skeptical	of	this	optimistic	view.125	
To	start	with,	China	has	clearly	expressed	the	importance	of	economic	interaction	in	
the	goal	of	unification.	In	May	1979,	China	released	the	“Temporary	Regulations	Regarding	
Opening	Trade	with	Taiwan”,	which	noted	that	“Trade	with	Taiwan	is	a	special	form	of	
trade	in	the	transitional	period	before	Taiwan	returns	to	the	motherland…to	create	
conditions	for	unification	of	the	motherland.”126	The	PRC’s	promotion	of	economic	
exchange	is	in	service	of	getting	Taiwan	to	agree	to	the	PRC’s	idea	for	unification,	which	is	
based	on	two	ideas	to	force	the	Taiwanese	government	to	agree.	Functional	and	socio-
cultural	spillover	are	what	the	PRC	is	relying	on	to	help	them	succeed,	and	they	see	
economic	cooperation	as	the	path	toward	that	goal.		
The	concept	of	economic	exchange	in	this	situation	is	closely	related	to	the	concept	
of	dollar/checkbook	diplomacy,	though	on	a	smaller	scale.	Checkbook	diplomacy	refers	to	
the	use	of	foreign	aid	and	investment	to	gain	favor,	though	China	is	not	only	acting	directly	
through	economics.	Taiwanese	companies,	which	are	now	beginning	to	fully	enjoy	the	
benefits	of	the	Chinese	market	and	workforce,	are	campaigning	on	the	mainland’s	behalf	
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for	increasing	trade	liberalization.	China	appears	to	be	relying	on	these	companies	and	
their	own	efforts	to	secure	the	economic	upper	hand	in	order	to	force	Taiwan’s	compliance.		
China’s	economic	power	in	cross-strait	relations	did	not	come	about	overnight.	For	
most	of	the	first	four	decades	of	the	ROC	on	Taiwan	era,	the	Taiwanese	government	refused	
to	loosen	investment	regulations	regarding	mainland	China,	severely	restricting	Taiwanese	
investment	in	China.	Similarly,	the	PRC	was	initially	not	open	to	foreign	direct	investment,	
which	they	perceived	as	a	reversion	to	the	imperialist	era	they	had	fought	so	hard	to	
escape.	Instead,	the	PRC	favored	grants	and	guidance	from	the	other	communist	
heavyweight,	the	Soviet	Union,	until	the	Sino-Soviet	split	in	1960.	The	Reform	Era’s	Special	
Economic	Zones	in	the	1980s	marked	the	opening	of	China	to	global	capital.	
Despite	the	strict	regulations,	though,	by	1989	Taiwanese	investments	in	China	had	
reached	160	million	USD	and	was	quickly	rising.127	In	an	effort	to	regain	a	hold	on	the	
economic	integration	that	was	quickly	moving	forward	without	them,	the	Taiwanese	
government	began	to	loosen	regulations	in	1990.	With	a	relatively	small	investment	
market,	China	became	a	very	attractive	market	to	Taiwan,	with	geographical	proximity	and	
cultural/linguistic	similarities	being	cited	as	primary	motivations	for	the	rush	of	
investment	towards	the	end	of	the	1990s.	With	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	Taiwan	began	
decreasing	investment	in	many	Southeast	Asia	countries	in	favor	of	the	mainland	and	Hong	
Kong.	For	the	first	five	years	of	the	2000s,	Taiwan’s	investment	in	mainland	China	was	12	
times	larger	than	the	combined	investment	in	Southeast	Asia	countries	like	Singapore	and	
Malaysia.128	In	2001,	Taiwan’s	investment	in	China	accounted	for	39%	of	all	outward	
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investment,	and	by	the	end	of	the	decade,	that	had	increased	to	84%	of	Taiwan’s	total	
outward	investment.129	Despite	starting	to	open	to	investment	in	the	mainland	much	later	
than	many	of	the	other	foreign	investors	in	China,	Taiwan’s	giant	investment	enabled	it	to	
catch	up	with	other	investors	in	a	very	short	time.	In	2010,	roughly	6.3%	of	all	foreign	
direct	investment	(FDI)	in	China	was	from	Taiwan,	making	it	the	second	largest	“foreign”	
investor,	behind	Hong	Kong.130	Most	of	Taiwan’s	investment	has	focused	on	the	
manufacturing	sector,	reflecting	the	common	East-West	economic	connection	which	relies	
on	China	for	manufacturing	and	a	cheap	workforce.	For	20	years	following	the	loosening	of	
Taiwan’s	investment	regulations,	roughly	86%	of	their	investment	in	China	was	solely	in	
manufacturing.131	
The	economic	relationship	has	multiple	dimensions	to	it.	With	Hong	Kong	included,	
over	40%	of	Taiwan’s	total	exports	are	to	China.132	This	has	allowed	Taiwan	to	maintain	a	
large	trade	surplus,	enabling	it	to	finance	imports	from	Japan	and	South	Korea	without	a	
problem.	Taiwanese-owned	companies	are	often	among	the	top	exporting	companies	in	
China,	three	of	which	even	being	the	leading	exporting	companies	in	2009.133	Meanwhile,	
Taiwan	has	slowed	imports	from	China,	with	those	imports	accounting	for	less	than	20%	of	
Taiwan’s	total	imports.	This	is	not	too	concerning	to	China.	Though	important,	Taiwan’s	
economy	is	relatively	small,	and	the	island	has	a	small	population.	Unlike	China	in	relation	
to	Taiwan,	Taiwan	is	not	an	attractive	market	to	Chinese	businesses.	To	these	
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entrepreneurs,	“inducing	Taiwan’s	financial	capital	into	the	mainland	is	therefore	more	
essential	than	asking	Taiwan	to	open	up	its	market.”134	
Despite	seemingly	reaping	more	benefits	from	the	economic	arrangement	than	the	
mainland,	Taiwan’s	actions	fall	more	in	line	with	reacting,	than	acting.	Previously	it	was	
mentioned	that	prior	to	more	liberal	investment	policies,	Taiwan’s	investment	in	China	was	
still	growing.	This	was	not	due	to	entirely	legal	investment,	and	the	liberalization	was	more	
so	a	passive	response	to	make	it	legal.	A	similar	situation	occurred	in	the	early	2010s	with	
the	signing	of	the	Economic	Cooperation	Framework	Agreement	(ECFA).	China’s	work	on	
the	ECFA	was	to	promote	the	cross-strait	economic	relationship,	but	Taiwan’s	agreement	
to	sign	the	ECFA	was	more	of	a	passive	reaction	to	an	uncontrollable	relationship	that	
continues	to	get	closer	and	closer	economically.	Taiwan’s	president	at	the	time,	President	
Ma	Ying-jeou,	considered	the	ECFA	as	comparable	to	a	Free	Trade	Agreement	(FTA).	
Taiwan	had	been	excluded	from	the	growing	number	of	FTAs	because	of	China.	This	only	
got	worse	with	China’s	continuing	negotiations	with	the	Association	of	Southeast	Asian	
Nations	(ASEAN),	which	led	to	an	FTA	that	took	effect	in	2011.	Further	negotiations	
between	ASEAN	and	China,	Japan,	and	South	Korea	to	create	ASEAN+3	was	perceived	as	
further	hurting	Taiwan’s	economic	significance.135	The	threat	of	marginalization	has	
pushed	Taiwan	to	seek	an	economic	agreement	with	China,	resulting	in	the	ECFA.	
While	initially	it	appears	that	Taiwan	is	the	one	mostly	benefiting	from	the	
economic	relationship	with	China,136	in	reality,	“China’s	dependence	on	Taiwan’s	
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investment	finally	resulted	in	Taiwan’s	reliance	on	trade	with	China.”137	The	strong	
economic	link	Taiwan	and	China	have	suggests	that	if	there	are	any	significant	changes	to	
China’s	economy,	in	terms	of	policy	or	global	recession,	there	would	be	massive	
consequences	for	Taiwan.	Furthermore,	some	scholars	argue	that	this	close	economic	
connection	makes	Taiwan	valuable	to	China.138	In	terms	of	imports,	this	is	far	from	the	
truth.	Most	of	the	imports	from	Taiwan	could	easily	be	substituted	by	goods	from	countries	
like	Japan	and	South	Korea.	The	concern	from	these	countries	about	the	ECFA	suggests	that	
if	there	were	any	economic	problems	between	China	and	Taiwan,	China	would	have	no	
problem	switching	its	import	sources.	Though	on	paper	the	ECFA,	along	with	China’s	other	
trade	agreements,	seems	to	place	China	in	a	disadvantaged	position,	the	truth	is	that	it	
strengthens	China’s	existing	trade	relationships	and	increases	its	economic	importance	in	
the	region	making	it	far	more	valuable	to	Taiwan	than	Taiwan	is	to	China.	This	reliance	is	
further	backed	by	the	increasing	number	of	Taiwanese	fixed	assets	in	the	PRC,	and	the	
growing	Taiwanese	reliance	on	PRC	manufacturing	and	labor.139	
The	significance	of	this	asymmetric	trade	relationship	is	found	in	understanding	
dollar	and	checkbook	diplomacy.	Instead	of	aid,	general	trade	and	investment	becomes	the	
influencing	factor.	In	these	forms	of	diplomacy,	a	nation’s	westphalian	sovereignty	is	
violated.	When	one	nation	can	enact	its	will	in	a	different	nation,	foreign	influence	has	
invaded.	This	is	what	China’s	position	allows	it	to	do,	and	has	already	done,	though	more	
indirectly.	China	has	become	so	valuable	to	Taiwan,	that	should	China	cease	trade,	Taiwan’s	
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economy	would	be	damaged	perhaps	beyond	repair.	Already,	with	Taiwan’s	passive	actions	
merely	legalizing	existing	trade	and	agreeing	to	the	ECFA,	do	we	see	how	China’s	economic	
power	has	controlled	Taiwanese	policy.	Taiwanese	companies	who	operate	in	China	have	
lobbied	for	increasing	trade	liberalization,	which	has	lessened	the	power	Taiwan	has	over	
its	economy	and	policies.	
The	economic	relationship	post-ECFA	has	been	relatively	tumultuous,	particularly	in	
the	past	four	years.	The	agreement	was	signed	during	the	beginning	years	of	Ma	Ying-jeou’s	
administration,	and	in	the	short	time	following	the	agreement,	Taiwan’s	investment	in	
China	remained	steadily	high.	In	2016,	though,	two	significant	things	happened	that	have	
had	a	deep	impact	on	Taiwan’s	continuing	investment	in	China:	the	elections	of	Tsai	Ing-
wen	and	Donald	Trump	as	the	new	Taiwanese	and	American	presidents.	When	Tsai	Ing-
wen	took	office,	she	announced	that	her	plan	was	to	revitalize	a	stagnating	economy	
through	the	promotion	of	a	“New	Southbound	Policy’	in	order	to	elevate	the	scope	and	
diversity	of	[the	Taiwanese]	external	economy,	and	to	bid	farewell	to	our	past	overreliance	
on	a	single	market.”140	Historically,	Tsai	has	not	been	a	supporter	of	Taiwanese-mainland	
China	unification,	so	it	comes	as	no	surprise	that	the	single	market	she	is	referring	to	in	
that	speech	is	the	Chinese	market.	The	impact	of	US	President	Trump’s	election	is	less	
direct,	but	still	significant.	Though	Tsai’s	policies	have	been	a	motivating	factor	for	
decreasing	investment	in	China,	“the	growing	trade	dispute	between	the	United	States	and	
China	has	accelerated	the	shift	in	Taiwanese	investment	away	from	China.”141	In	2018,	
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China,	including	Hong	Kong,	accounted	for	41.2%	of	all	Taiwanese	exports.142	In	the	first	
half	of	2019,	in	a	matter	of	months,	China’s	share	dropped	over	3%.143	While	decreasing	
their	reliance	on	the	Chinese	market,	Taiwan	focused	on	increasing	investment	in	various	
countries,	including	the	ASEAN	countries	and	the	United	States,	whose	share	of	Taiwanese	
exports	grew	to	match	China’s	loss.	President	Trump’s	plan	is	to	bring	manufacturing	back	
to	the	United	States.	If	this	happens,	the	impact	on	the	China-centered	economic	system	in	
Asia	will	radically	change.	If	the	US	pulls	out	manufacturing	from	the	PRC,	then	Taiwan	will	
likely	speed	up	their	own	departure	from	China.	
The	new	“Southbound	Policy”	that	President	Tsai	articulated	focuses	on	5	programs:	
industry	innovation,	medical	cooperation,	policy	and	youth	forums,	regional	agriculture,	
and	talent	cultivation.144	These	programs	are	directed	at	other	countries	in	the	region,	in	an	
effort	to	reduce	reliance	on	China.	Aside	from	the	general	reliance	on	China,	Tsai’s	
reasoning	for	this	new	policy	is	likely	based	on	her	opposition	to	unification.	As	mentioned	
previously,	China	has	made	no	attempt	to	hide	the	fact	that	they	believe	economic	
integration	will	lead	to	unification.	In	fact,	they	proudly	announced	economic	integration	as	
the	beginning	of	that	process.	Tsai’s	new	policy,	which	would	directly	combat	economic	
integration	with	China,	would	move	Taiwan	away	from	the	direction	of	unification,	in	a	
method	that	may	be	unlikely	to	be	undone	by	a	successor	in	the	event	that	the	opposing	
KMT	party	takes	power	again.	
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 International	Recognition	
Arguably	one	of	the	most	important	forms	of	sovereignty	in	the	modern	age	is	
international	legal	sovereignty,	and	it	is	in	the	international	realm	on	which	the	PRC	and	
Taiwan	actively	wage	war.	Recognition	and	membership	in	international	organizations	has	
always	been	a	central	point	to	the	cross-strait	conflict.	This	is	something	that	the	PRC	has	in	
the	past	few	decades	come	to	realize	and	it	has	led	them	away	from	seriously	considering	a	
military	solution.	Instead	they	have	favored	the	diplomatic	approach,	which	has	brought	
them	success,	so	“Beijing	continues	to	gain	ground	diplomatically	and	has	managed	to	
shrunk	Taiwan’s	‘international	space.’”145	Since	the	US	began	to	work	toward	the	
normalization	of	relations	with	mainland	China	in	the	1970s,	the	PRC	has	defeated	Taiwan	
in	multiple	areas,	most	importantly	the	change	in	representatives	to	the	United	Nations	in	
1971.	Though	its	effectiveness	has	been	debated	for	as	long	as	its	existed,	the	United	
Nations	was	the	first	organization	created	in	the	aftermath	of	WWII,	and	it	stands	as	a	
symbol	of	the	world	power	dynamics	that	came	from	the	defeat	of	the	Axis	Powers.	The	UN	
Security	Council	only	has	5	permanent	members,	the	countries	which	led	and	were	the	face	
of	the	Allied	Powers	during	the	war.	These	permanent	members	enjoy	a	variety	of	
privileges	not	given	to	any	other	member,	most	notably	the	veto	power.	Their	position	on	
this	body	lends	a	certain	amount	of	legitimacy	and	strength	to	a	state	(it	must	be	approved	
by	the	other	members).	
It	took	the	PRC	a	long	time	to	get	to	this	point,	though.	Despite	the	strides	toward	
beating	Taiwan	in	the	international	arena,	the	PRC	generally	kept	Taiwan	separated	from	
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the	rest	of	their	foreign	policy	and	defined	the	topic	as	an	internal	problem.146	This	has	
begun	to	change,	and	it	all	centers	around	the	rise	of	China.	The	PRC	has	been	growing	
stronger	and	stronger,	both	militarily	and	economically,	as	a	country	in	the	past	couple	of	
decades.147	Zheng	Bijian,	a	PRC	advisor,	articulated	the	Chinese	elite’s	theory	of	China’s	
peaceful	rise,	which	states	that	China,	on	its	path	to	becoming	a	world	power,	will	take	a	
pathway	different	from	that	of	traditional	world	powers	(violence).	Critics	of	this	theory	
claim	that	it	is	not	possible,	citing	the	PRC’s	seeming	inability	to	completely	rule	out	use	of	
military	force	against	Taiwan.148	Former	PRC	President	Hu	Jintao	has,	however,	worked	
against	that	very	idea,	suggesting	that	“peace	and	development	should	be	the	main	theme	
of	Cross-Strait	relations,	and	the	common	goals	of	the	people	both	in	the	mainland	and	
Taiwan.”149	That	the	“Taiwan	issue”	has	now	been	brought	into	the	overall	Chinese	foreign	
policy	indicates	that	the	PRC	leaders	are	more	and	more	seeing	the	cross-strait	conflict	
from	an	international	perspective	–	not	that	they	see	it	as	a	state	vs.	state	conflict,	simply	
that	the	PRC	understands	the	importance	of	the	international	realm	in	this	conflict.	Chinese	
diplomats	now	discuss	Taiwan	policy	freely	with	other	countries,	outside	of	requesting	that	
the	other	country	reiterates	the	“one	China”	policy.150		
Taiwan’s	battle	for	international	recognition	has	been	directly	tied	to	the	concept	of	
checkbook	diplomacy	since	the	1970s.	and	in	this	case	recognition,	with	other	countries,	
and	having	been	excluded	from	the	United	Nations,	Taiwan	ensured	the	“the	formation	of	
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an	international	network	with	economic	ties	as	the	key	link.”151	For	decades	Taiwan	was	
able	to	survive	off	of	this,	and	used	this	economic	power	to	persuade	their	dwindling	allies	
to	help	secure	Taiwan’s	place	in	international	organizations	–	for	example,	Taiwan’s	latest	
bid	to	join	the	United	Nations	was	sponsored	by	one	of	the	countries	receiving	economic	
aid	from	Taiwan.	
Taiwan’s	checkbook	diplomacy	has	yet	to	result	in	success	and	an	overtaking	of	the	
PRC	as	the	dominant	representative	of	“China,”	though.	During	the	Chen	Shui-bian	
presidency,	Taiwan	lost	nine	allies	(starting	with	29),	and	had	only	gained	3.152	Chen’s	
successor,	President	Ma	Ying-jeou,	criticized	this,	and	took	a	step	back	from	the	
competition	for	allies,	arguing	that	Taiwan	could	not	afford	it	anymore.153	His	step	back	
marked	the	start	of	a	“diplomatic	truce”	during	which	neither	Taiwan	or	the	PRC	pursued	
aid	diplomacy	policies.	With	President	Tsai’s	election	in	2016,	however,	the	PRC	
abandoned	the	truce,	starting	with	the	normalization	of	relations	with	the	Gambia,	which	
had	previously	supported	Taiwan.	Though	many	critics	have	been	quick	to	argue	that	the	
PRC	merely	outbid	Taiwan	in	many	of	these	countries,	an	alternative	view	has	suggested	
that	Taiwan’s	inability	to	win	these	countries	was	not	due	to	an	overall	lack	of	economic	
power,	but	in	fact	a	frugal	policy	that	should	have	been	more	generous.	
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 Negotiating	“One	Country,	Two	Systems”	
The	PRC’s	Taiwan	policy	has	also	found	itself	going	in	a	new	direction.	Though	the	
PRC	ultimately	desires	unification	between	the	mainland	and	Taiwan,	the	immediate	
priority	is	now	to	prevent	any	attempt	by	the	Taiwanese	leaders	to	seek	independence.	
With	the	DPP	becoming	a	more	powerful	player	in	Taiwanese	politics,	the	PRC	is	seemingly	
becoming	more	and	more	concerned	with	the	possibility	that	a	DPP	government	may	
actively	pursue	independence.	In	this	regard,	though,	the	PRC	does	have	the	Taiwanese	
people	on	its	side	–	those	who	do	not	desire	full	independence	for	fear	of	war.	The	
Taiwanese	do	not	entirely	favor	unification	either,	though.	Now,	the	PRC	has	come	to	
realize	that	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	formula	does	not	look	like	an	attractive	offer	to	
the	people	of	Taiwan.	In	2005,	the	PRC’s	National	People’s	Congress	passed	a	new	
Antisecession	Law	for	the	precise	purpose	of	stopping	then-Taiwanese	President	Chen	
Shui-bian	from	moving	in	the	direction	of	“de	jure”	independence	(as	opposed	to	“de	facto”	
independence).	This	Antisecession	Law	was	initially	titled	“Unification,”	but	supposedly	out	
of	consideration	for	Taiwan,	and	to	indicate	the	PRC’s	policy	priority	toward	Taiwan,	the	
title	was	changed.154	Under	Hu	Jintao,	the	PRC	also	changed	their	wording	of	the	“one	
China”	principle	to	the	more	vague	“1992	consensus.”	Though	essentially	the	same	thing,	
the	vaguer	term	allows	more	room	for	interpretation.155	This	change	in	wording	has	also	
had	the	effect	of	reconsidering	the	term	“one	China,”	in	favor	of	a	“two	China”	policy.	
Though	intentionally	not	explicit,	the	vague	term	of	“1992	consensus”	allows	interpretation	
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of	“two	China,”	to	a	certain	extent.	This	could	potentially	have	the	effect	of	making	the	
negotiating	table	more	attractive	to	pro-independence	politicians	in	Taiwan.	
Taiwan	under	Chen	Shui-bian	was	not	as	friendly	in	return.	In	early	2006,	Chen	
announced	that	the	National	Unification	Council	and	the	National	Unification	Guidelines	
would	be	abolished.	After	immediate	backlash	from	the	PRC	and	the	US	(who	directly	
intervened),	Chen	agreed	to	change	his	wording	from	abolished	to	ceased.	Though	
functionally	meaning	the	same	thing,	one	word	carried	a	much	stronger	connotation.156	
Talks	between	the	two	countries	began	in	early	1992,	but	in	a	nongovernmental	
form.	At	the	end	of	’91,	the	mainland	had	established	the	Association	for	Relations	Across	
the	Taiwan	Strait	(ARATS),	and	earlier	that	same	year	Taiwan	established	the	Straits	
Exchange	Foundation	(SEF).	The	Taiwanese	government,	who	held	a	“Three	No’s”	policy	
that	prevented	formal	talks,	created	the	SEF	for	the	purpose	of	resolving	issues	the	
government	themselves	could	not	deal	with.	ARATS	was	designed	to	promote	connections	
between	the	two	sides,	with	the	goal	of	peaceful	reunification.	With	these	purposes	in	
mind,	the	two	groups	met	in	Beijing	to	discuss	two	topics	in	particular:	cross	strait	use	of	
notarized	documents,	and	tracing/compensation	for	lost	cross	strait	registered	mail.157	
	 During	these	talks,	the	“One	China”	principle	was	brought	into	the	discussion.	The	
Deputy	Director	of	the	Office	of	Taiwan	Affairs,	Tang	Shubei,	was	authorized	to	speak	on	
five	principles,	most	notably	the	2nd	principle,	which	stated	“In	dealing	with	affairs	relating	
to	contacts	between	the	two	sides,	we	should	adhere	to	the	one-China	principle	and	oppose	
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any	form	of	‘two	Chinas’	or	‘one	China,	one	Taiwan’”158	The	Taiwanese	representatives	
were	not	pleased	with	the	PRC’s	“demand”	that	Taiwan	accept	a	“one	China	principle.”	The	
Lee	Teng-hui	administration	prepared	plans	that	aimed	for	a	conclusion	of	“one	China,”	but	
subject	to	interpretation	on	each	side.	The	PRC	accepted	this	idea,	but	when	it	came	time	to	
sign	the	agreement	for	the	plan,	the	Taiwan	representatives	recorded	the	date	with	the	
ROC	Minguo	Calendar.	According	to	Taiwan,	had	the	Beijing	representatives	accepted	this,	
it	would	have	accomplished	“the	negotiation	goal	‘one	China	with	respective	
interpretations.’”159	With	this,	Taiwan	placed	the	blame	for	the	collapse	of	talks	on	the	PRC,	
though	it’s	worth	noting	that	the	Taiwan	representatives	did	not	follow	the	idea	of	
respective	interpretations	by	using	the	ROC’s	calendar.	Had	the	PRC	signed	the	agreement,	
and	Taiwan	notes	this,	it	would’ve	meant	the	PRC	accepting	that	the	“China”	meant	the	
“Republic	of	China.”	
	 After	the	PRC	negatively	responded	to	this	plan,	Taiwan	introduced	a	second	
negotiation	plan.	This	plan	was	very	similar	to	the	first,	and	the	SEF	conveyed	through	a	
press	release	and	letter	to	the	ARATS	that	this	plan	would	say	that	“both	sides	of	the	
Taiwan	Strait	adhered	to	the	‘One	China	principle,’	but	they	differ	from	each	other	on	the	
meaning	of	‘one	China.’	The	CCP	believes	‘one	China’	is	the	‘People’s	Republic	of	China,’	
while	Taiwan	believes	‘one	China’	should	mean	the	ROC…”160	The	PRC	did	not	accept	this	
model	either,	and	countered	with	a	proposal	that	both	sides	would	strive	to	achieve	
unification,	but	that	cross-strait	negotiations	would	not	discuss	“one	China.”	Despite	this	
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generous	offer	to	leave	the	topic,	Taiwan	did	not	accept	this	proposal,	and	there	have	not	
been	further	negotiations	on	that	subject	since	then.	
In	1999,	Taiwanese	KMT	President	Lee	Teng-Hui	suggested	a	two-state	theory,	that	
cross-Strait	relations	were	a	“special	state-to-state	relationship.”161	Though	a	statement	
seemingly	designed	more	for	the	upcoming	presidential	election,	Lee’s	theory	has	had	
lasting	negative	effects.	The	PRC	interpreted	the	statement	as	an	indication	that	Taiwan	
would	push	more	for	an	independent	state,	as	opposed	to	reunification.	This	only	led	to	the	
PRC	working	to	block	that	path	to	independence.	The	1996	missile	tests,	which	preceded	
Lee’s	statement	of	two-states,	was	viewed	by	Chinese	leaders	as	having	discredited	the	
DPP’s	platform	–	important	to	them,	as	the	DPP	is	the	leading	party	in	support	of	an	
independent	Taiwan.	Additionally,	the	PRC	has	worked	to	block	Taiwan’s	attempts	at	
formal	international	recognition,	their	efforts	being	validated	by	a	statement	from	the	US,	
Taiwan’s	biggest	ally.	In	mid-1998,	US	President	Clinton	announced	the	US	would	“adhere	
to	‘three	no’s’’	(no	support	for	Taiwan	independence,	no	support	for	one	China/one	
Taiwan,	and	no	support	for	Taiwan	representation	in	international	bodies	where	state	
membership	is	required)	…”162	
The	two	main	parties	in	Taiwanese	politics	have	held	opposing	views	on	the	1992	
Consensus.	The	Consensus	was	reached	between	the	PRC	and	the	KMT	government,	and	
though	the	KMT	is	no	longer	the	dominant	party	in	the	Taiwanese	government,	they	have	
maintained	the	same	stance.	The	DPP,	however,	have	promoted	a	far	different	idea,	more	in	
line	with	Lee	Teng-hui’s	two-states	theory,	much	to	the	dismay	of	the	PRC,	who	had	hoped	
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a	pro	one-China	candidate	would	win.	Though	the	Taiwanese	government’s	stance	on	this	
has	been	fairly	relaxed	(Lee	Teng-Hui	backed	away	from	the	theory	when	it	received	
international	criticism,	and	Chen	Shui-bian,	though	campaigning	on	Taiwan’s	
independence,	did	not	follow	through	with	the	policies	he	claimed	to	support),	the	DPP	
government	has	still	maintained	a	refusal	to	accept	One	China	or	the	model	the	PRC	
continues	to	advocate	for.	The	most	recent	rejection	occurred	only	a	few	months	ago,	when	
Taiwan’s	President	Tsai	Ing-wen	rejected	the	idea	that	the	model	could	be	used	to	reunify	
the	island	with	the	mainland,	noting	that	“such	an	arrangement	had	set	Hong	Kong	‘on	the	
edge	of	disorder’.”163	
Since	the	inauguration	of	Tsai	Ing-wen,	China’s	continuing	goal	has	been	to	pressure	
the	Taiwanese	president	into	accepting	the	PRC’s	interpretation	of	the	1992.	In	response	to	
the	pressure,	though,	President	Tsai	has	not	conceded,	in	fact	rather	the	opposite,	“Tsai	Ing-
wen	has	adopted	tougher	rhetoric	against	Beijing…”164	Bonnie	Glaser’s	testimony	before	
the	US-China	Economic	and	Security	Review	Commission	in	late	2019	mentioned	a	few	of	
the	most	important	developments	in	cross-strait	relations	over	that	year.	Specifically,	on	
the	subject	of	the	1992	Consensus,	in	January	2019	Xi	Jinping	delivered	a	speech	dedicated	
to	Taiwan	policy.	He	noted	that	“cross	strait	reunification	is	the	inevitable	requirement	of	
the	great	rejuvenation	of	the	Chinese	nation	in	the	new	era”	and	that	both	sides	should	
begin	talks	“aimed	at	creating	a	version	of	one	country,	two	systems	for	Taiwan.”165	
President	Tsai’s	response	to	this	speech	followed	up	on	what	she	had	already	been	
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expressing.	She	claimed	that	“Xi	Jinping’s	speech	proved	that	the	‘1992	Consensus’	was	tied	
to	‘one	country,	two	systems,’	which	was	unacceptable	to	the	people	of	Taiwan.”166	
Though	the	KMT	has	historically	been	the	party	in	support	of	“one	China,”	the	recent	
2020	presidential	and	legislative	elections	have	left	the	future	of	the	party	in	the	air.	
Younger	party	members	have	spoken	out,	claiming	that	perhaps	the	1992	Consensus	that	
the	KMT	has	supported	as	the	basis	for	cross-strait	negotiations	is	outdated.	Taipei	City	
councilor	Yu	Shu-hui	and	legislator	Hsu	Yu-jen	have	been	a	few	of	the	more	vocal	KMT	
politicians	speaking	out.	According	to	Yu	Shu-hui,	“part	of	the	problem	with	the	‘1992	
consensus,’	is	that	many	Taiwanese	today	do	not	know	how	the	‘1992	consensus’	came	
about,	and	it	has	now	been	‘distorted’	into	being	equated	with	China’s	‘one	country,	two	
systems’	model	and	used	to	‘smear’	people.”167	Hsu	Yu-jen’s	echoed	Yu’s	sentiment,	noting	
that	“The	1992	consensus	has	collapsed..”168	
In	2013,	the	DPP	held	a	series	of	discussions,	one	of	which	focused	on	the	1992	
Consensus.	In	an	attempt	to	advance	the	Taiwanese	political	attitude	on	Consensus,	both	
DPP	and	KMT	speakers	were	present,	notably	Su	Chi	from	the	KMT	and	Chiou	I-jen	from	
the	DPP.	Su	Chi’s	presence	was	of	particular	interest,	as	he	had	previously	(and	reiterated	
this	in	his	opening	remarks	at	the	2013	discussions)	stated	that	he	“invented	the	term	in	
April	2000,	just	before	the	DPP	came	to	power…”169	Su	said	he	had	intended	for	the	
vagueness	of	the	consensus	to	persuade	the	PRC	and	new	Taiwanese	governments	to	
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continue	talking.	The	DPP	has	never	refused	to	acknowledge	the	fact	that	there	were	
meetings	between	the	two	sides	in	1992.	Former	Taiwan	Premier	Frank	Hsieh	noted	that	
“There	were	agreements	reached	in	that	[1992]	meeting	and	we	should	respect	some	of	the	
spirit	of	these	agreements	because	they	are	historical	facts.”170	Instead,	the	DPP	and	other	
critics	have	rejected	the	“1992	Consensus”	on	the	grounds	that	PRC	leaders	have	never	
acknowledged	the	second	part	of	the	“consensus”	–	that	each	side	could	interpret	what	
“one	China”	meant.171		
Taiwan	has	evidently	had	a	difficult	relationship	with	the	forms	of	sovereignty	
described	in	Stephen	Krasner’s	model,	which	has	had	interesting	implications	for	the	
meaning	of	“one	country,	two	systems”	in	the	present	day.	Taiwan	has	achieved	success	in	
the	realms	of	domestic	sovereignty	with	their	advancements	in	democracy.	The	Taiwanese	
government,	though	filled	with	debates	between	the	KMT	and	DPP,	is	unquestionably	in	
power	over	the	Taiwanese	island.	Mainland	China,	despite	their	displeasure	with	the	fact,	
has	conceded	that	they	do	not	currently	control	the	region	(though	they	have	not	given	up	
their	right	to	it).	
In	contrast,	Taiwan’s	battle	for	international	recognition	has	been	an	undeniable	
loss.	Though	over	the	years	a	country	will	occasionally	revert	to	recognition	of	the	ROC	on	
Taiwan,	most	countries	either	recognize	the	PRC	as	the	one	representative	of	all	China,	or	
they	do	not	recognize	either	side	at	all.	The	effect	of	the	PRC	being	the	sole	representative	
of	China	in	the	United	Nations	and	broader	international	community	has	placed	it	in	
positions	of	power	enabling	it	to	prevent	Taiwan	from	engaging	with	the	global	community	
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in	most	international	organizations.	Despite	continuous	applications,	some	supported	by	
member	nations,	the	United	Nations	has	refused	to	grant	Taiwan	representation,	even	
under	the	name	Taiwan.	In	the	few	organizations	they	have	been	permitted	to	participate	
in,	like	the	World	Health	Organization,	they	have	existed	under	the	name	Chinese	Taipei,	
and	fewer	organizations	acknowledge	Taiwan	on	the	lists	of	their	member	countries.	
Economic	control	is	where	the	ideas	of	sovereignty	get	muddled,	and	an	idea	of	a	
hybrid,	or	shared	sovereignty	comes	into	play.	We	have	observed	that	in	Taiwan	political	
decisions	appear	to	follow	economic	trends.	First	with	the	initial	opening	of	Taiwan	to	PRC	
investment	in	the	1990s,	followed	by	the	signing	of	the	ECFA	in	2010,	we	begin	to	see	an	
image	of	a	Taiwan	with	little	power	over	its	own	economy.	The	Taiwanese	politicians	are	
essentially	reacting	as	opposed	to	being	proactive.	Only	within	the	past	few	years,	
beginning	with	the	start	of	Taiwan	President	Tsai’s	administration	in	2016	and	helped	
along	by	the	start	of	the	China-United	States	trade	war	in	2018,	have	we	begun	to	see	
Taiwan	taking	back	control	by	advocating	for	Taiwanese	companies	to	leave	China.	Though	
some	companies	have	begun	to	do	so,	the	large	number	of	fixed	assets	in	China	means	that	
it	will	take	a	long	time	for	a	dedicated	company	to	abandon	the	Chinese	market	and	
workforce.	If	the	next	Taiwanese	president	is	KMT,	or	otherwise	more	sympathetic	to	the	
calls	for	unification,	though,	then	some	of	the	work	Tsai	has	put	into	diversifying	the	
economy	could	be	undone.	Though	the	economic	connections	with	Southeast	Asian	
countries	may	never	be	fully	undone,	should	China	prove	to	again	be	a	better	location	to	
operate	a	company,	many	of	the	companies	working	to	leave	may	decide	to	remain	or	go	
back.	
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There	are	also	further	concerns	regarding	the	status	of	Taiwanese	companies	
centered	in	mainland	China,	though,	which	could	potentially	have	the	effect	of	Tsai’s	efforts	
being	backed	by	a	successor	from	an	opposing	party.	Unlike	Taiwan,	who	is	merely	reacting	
to	the	markets	and	investment,	China	has	a	clear	hand	in	their	own	economic	development	
with	the	development	of	the	Special	Economic	Zones.	The	placement	of	Taiwanese	
companies	in	China	could	potentially	be	very	dangerous	for	Taiwan,	as	in	the	event	that	
Taiwan	disagrees	with	China	too	much,	too	quickly,	China	could	freeze	or	seize	the	fixed	
assets	of	a	large	amount	of	the	Taiwanese	companies	and	investors	located	in	mainland	
China.	The	effect	of	this	danger	and	Taiwan’s	existing	passive	relationship	with	their	
economy	is	that	ultimately	the	self-determination	that	has	been	championed	in	Taiwan	and	
the	strong	government	they	claim	to	have	may	not	have	as	strong	foundations	as	they	
would	like.	
China	claims	that	“one	country,	two	systems”	would	allow	for	Taiwan	to	continue	to	
exist	by	itself,	free	from	interference.	With	the	two	separate	economic	systems,	not	
attempting	to	merge	the	two	societies	on	that	level	makes	sense.	On	a	theoretical,	abstract	
basis,	this	model	seems	unproblematic	for	Taiwan.	The	problems	present	themselves	when	
one	considers	the	context	in	which	this	model	could	be	implemented,	and	the	substance	of	
ongoing	China-Taiwan	relations.	From	China’s	use	of	economic	power	in	gaining	
international	recognition	to	the	1996	Taiwan	Strait	Crisis,	when	China	appeared	to	be	
attempting	to	influence	the	Taiwanese	elections,	to	the	present	day	when	China’s	economic	
power	allows	it	to	potentially	cause	devastation	to	the	Taiwanese	economy,	China	holds	the	
upper	hand	in	any	negotiations	that	may	take	place.	Depending	on	what	the	future	holds	
for	continued	Chinese/Taiwanese	economic	cooperation,	this	upper	hand	may	end	up	
72	
	
allowing	them	to	force	unification	on	their	terms,	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	proposal.	
Considering	the	implementation	in	Hong	Kong,	this	may	not	be	favorable	to	Taiwan.	
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 Conclusion	
How	has	sovereignty	played	out	in	Taiwan	and	Hong	Kong,	and	how	has	that	
affected	the	implementation	of	“one	country,	two	systems?”	Furthermore,	and	perhaps	
more	importantly,	what	does	the	implementation	and	rejection	of	this	model	tell	us	about	
sovereignty	itself?	What	does	this	model	mean	for	the	future	of	sovereignty,	or	the	“hybrid”	
sovereignty	that	has	been	outlined	in	the	previous	chapters	in	Hong	Kong	and	Taiwan?	
Those	are	the	driving	ideas	behind	this	paper,	and	even	at	its	conclusion,	looking	back	on	
the	two	case	studies,	it	is	difficult	to	come	to	a	simple	answer	to	that	question.	The	concept	
of	sovereignty	plays	an	important	role	in	analyzing	the	current	implementation	of	the	
model	as	well	as	the	region	the	model	was	initially	developed	for.	Sovereignty	is	a	difficult	
concept	to	understand	and	explain,	so	it	comes	as	no	surprise	that	in	Stephen	Krasner’s	
exploration	of	sovereignty	he	came	to	the	conclusion	that	ultimately,	scholars	in	different	
fields	have	all	been	working	under	different	aspects	of	sovereignty:	domestic,	Westphalian,	
interdependence,	and	international	legal	sovereignty.	Krasner	notes	that	all	these	forms	of	
sovereignty	are	relevant	to	states	and	are	intertwined	and	occasionally	dependent	on	one	
another.	Some	states	trade	one	aspect	for	another.	This	is	often	the	case	in	international	
organizations	with	supranational	powers.	In	exchange	for	membership	in	the	international	
organization,	which	grants	a	state	international	legal	sovereignty,	a	state	may	cede	
Westphalian	sovereignty,	and	allow	foreign	interference,	to	an	extent.		
The	concept	of	“one	country,	two	systems”	is	tied	to	ceding	Westphalian	and	usually	
some	degree	of	international	legal	sovereignty.	The	actual	implementation	in	Hong	Kong,	
however,	has	led	to	a	slightly	different	situation.	In	the	first	chapter,	I	explored	the	
development	and	implementation	of	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	model,	from	Ye	
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Jianying’s	initial	proposal	for	Taiwan	to	the	reforms	of	the	last	British	governor,	Chris	
Patten.	Hong	Kong	existed	initially	under	British	control,	and	its	retrocession	in	1997	
immediately	handed	over	supreme	control	to	the	PRC.	Though	there	is	local	governance,	
from	the	past	British	governors	to	the	current	Chief	Executives,	the	territory	was	and	still	is	
ultimately	subject	to	the	whims	of	the	supreme	body.	In	the	past,	it	was	the	United	
Kingdom,	and	in	the	present	day	it	is	China’s	State	Council.	Debates	continue	over	whether	
China	is	“foreign”	to	Hong	Kong,	but	the	model	indicates	at	least	partial	independence,	and	
the	recent	protestors	in	Hong	Kong,	as	they	identify	less	and	less	as	Chinese,	would	likely	
be	inclined	to	agree	that	Hong	Kong	has	no	Westphalian	sovereignty,	and	that	that	may	
have	actually	caused	domestic	sovereignty	to	have	eroded.	
Hong	Kong’s	relationship	to	international	organizations,	however,	suggests	a	failure	
of	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	model	to	maintain	the	“one	country”	idea.	Aside	from	the	
Special	Economic	Zones,	Hong	Kong	ended	up	as	the	PRC’s	gateway	to	the	international	
markets.	A	condition	of	maintaining	the	capitalist	policies	in	the	territory	was	that	Hong	
Kong	needed	to	stay	a	member	in	certain	international	organizations.	The	World	Trade	
Organization,	and	the	Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	are	two	examples	of	this.	In	fact,	if	
you	check	the	World	Trade	Organization’s	list	of	member	countries,	China	and	Hong	Kong	
are	separately	listed.		
Krasner	noted	that	Hong	Kong	must	be	granted	“quasi-autonomy”172	despite	it	being	
formally	part	of	China.	This	quasi-autonomy	was	practically	guaranteed	for	Hong	Kong	in	
the	“one	country,	two	systems”	model.	In	the	days	of	planning	Hong	Kong’s	retrocession,	
 
172	Stephen	D.	Krasner,	“Problematic	Sovereignty,”	in	Problematic	Sovereignty,	ed.	Stephen	Krasner	(New	
York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2001),	3.	
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China	was	still	figuring	out	Special	Economic	Zones.	Hong	Kong	was	already	a	global	city,	
and	China	knew	Hong	Kong	could	not	be	brought	into	the	fold	the	way	the	PRC	controlled	
the	rest	of	their	territory.	To	protect	Hong	Kong’s	economy,	China	believed	in	maintaining	
the	status	quo.	The	only	difference	was	in	who	ran	the	government.	Essentially,	Hong	
Kong’s	embeddedness	in	the	international	economy	at	the	time,	and	still	today,	is	the	
reason	for	its	quasi-autonomy.	Hong	Kong’s	international	status	also	raises	the	question	of	
if	the	Hong	Kongese	could	leverage	that	degree	of	international	recognition	in	order	to	
preserve	their	independent	judicial	system,	and	potentially	some	level	of	representative	
government.	Corporations	use	Hong	Kong	as	a	base	for	investing	in	China,	because	directly	
settling	in	China	could	be	risky.	An	independent	judiciary	and	a	nonauthoritarian	
government	in	Hong	Kong	are	meaningful	to	corporations	who	desire	to	invest	in	a	country	
without	risking	asset	seizure	or	other	consequences	that	may	come	with	an	authoritarian	
government.	In	an	increasingly	globalized	world,	international	legal	sovereignty	becomes	
more	and	more	important.	Without	validation	from	the	international	community,	treaties,	
economic	agreements,	etc.…,	a	state	can	have	all	other	forms	of	sovereignty	but	still	not	be	
considered	a	country.	This	is,	in	fact,	where	a	broader	connection	can	be	made	to	Taiwan.	
As	the	second	chapter	shows,	Taiwan	undeniably	has	domestic	sovereignty	over	the	
Taiwan	island	and	other	claimed	areas	not	strongly	contested	by	the	mainland,	even	
though	historically	this	was	not	the	case.	The	KMT,	upon	exile	to	the	island,	still	claimed	
that	they	held	sovereignty	over	all	of	China	but	could	simply	not	enforce	it.	As	time	went	
on,	and	Taiwan	lost	its	United	Nations	seat	and	recognition	from	most	countries	in	the	
world,	politics	changed	in	Taiwan.	Lee	Teng-hui’s	reforms	in	the	1990s	helped	with	
establishing	a	more	solid	claim	of	domestic	sovereignty,	when	he	revoked	the	emergency	
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legislation	which	had	provided	the	constitutional	basis	for	the	Republic	of	China	on	Taiwan.	
New	parliamentary	elections	could	take	place,	and	the	representative	bodies	no	longer	
claimed	to	represent	all	of	China.		
However,	Deng	Xiaoping	always	said	that	“one	country,	two	systems”	was	an	
economic	model,	not	a	political	one.	Though	it	is	hard	to	separate	liberal	economies	from	
liberal	governments,	the	treatment	of	Hong	Kong	proves	Deng’s	idea	true.	After	decades	of	
Taiwan	refusing	to	accept	the	PRC’s	proposal,	or	abandoning	negotiations	for	reunification,	
the	PRC	went	full	steam	ahead	into	advancing	the	economic	connection	between	the	two	
sides	of	the	Taiwan	Strait.	Since	Deng’s	reforms,	China’s	economy	has	rapidly	developed,	
quickly	catching	up	to	the	largest	economies	in	the	world.	Though	China	initially	needed	
Hong	Kong,	the	further	establishment	and	development	of	more	Special	Economic	Zones	
has	enabled	China	to	surpass	Hong	Kong.	Hong	Kong	still	exists	as	a	channel	for	foreign	
direct	investment,	and	Chinese	companies	use	the	region	as	a	launchpad	to	global	
expansion,	but	Hong	Kong	now	represents	an	incredibly	small	share	of	China’s	overall	
economy.	Hong	Kong	does	still	operate	as	a	portal	for	direct	investment,	and	many	
multinational	corporations	that	operate	in	China	are	based	in	Hong	Kong,	but	with	Hong	
Kong	reliant	on	the	mainland	for	food,	fresh	water,	and	other	essentials,	the	scales	tip	in	
favor	of	China.	
Economic	integration	appears	to	be	what	China	intends	for	Taiwan,	to	an	extent.	In	
recent	years	China	has	pushed	for	more	economic	cooperation,	leading	to	the	signing	of	the	
ECFA	in	2010.	This	agreement,	combined	with	China’s	efforts	to	prevent	Taiwan’s	
economic	diversification,	could	eventually	make	Taiwan	incredibly	dependent	on	the	
Chinese	economy.	China	has	also	worked	on	integrating	with	Taiwan	on	a	more	regional	
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level,	though,	working	on	both	an	economic	and	cultural	front.	The	Taiwan	Strait	separates	
Taiwan	Island	from	the	mainland	Fujian	province,	and	since	the	Chinese	Civil	War,	the	
province	has	been	split	between	the	mainland	and	Taiwan.	The	mainland	holds	most	of	the	
region,	including	the	mainland	region,	and	several	islands.	Taiwan,	on	the	other	hand,	only	
holds	a	few	islands	they	claim	to	be	part	of	the	Fujian	province.	The	mainland	has	
established	multiple	economic	and	technological	development	zones	in	Fujian	with	the	goal	
of	courting	the	Taiwanese,	drawing	them	in	and	establishing	firmer	economic	relations.	
Additionally,	Shanghai	has	established	itself	as	a	haven	on	the	mainland	for	the	Taiwanese.	
The	official	Shanghai	census	claims	that	Taiwanese	people	represent	roughly	¼	of	all	
people	from	outside	mainland	China	living	in	the	city	(though	unofficial	estimates	claim	
much	higher	numbers).173	By	presenting	these	regions	as	places	for	Taiwan	to	connect	with	
China,	the	mainland	is	reinforcing	and	further	developing	the	existing	relationships.	
By	maintaining	capitalist	policies,	Taiwan	could	operate	similarly	to	Hong	Kong,	and	
Taiwan’s	recent	work	to	diversify	their	economy	could	serve	to	cement	them	in	that	
position.	Hong	Kong	is	embedded	in	the	South	China	economy,	and	Taiwan	could	follow.	
The	current	economic	relationship	between	China	and	Taiwan	has	been	described	as	
similar	to	the	economic	relationship	between	countries	in	the	European	Union	(EU).	
Germany	is	by	far	the	most	economically	significant	country	in	the	EU,	and	when	it	came	to	
the	Greek	economic	crisis,	Germany’s	proposal	truly	only	served	to	reinforce	their	place	at	
the	top	by	supporting	the	implementation	of	harsh	conditions	on	Greece	as	a	result	of	it	
being	unable	to	live	up	to	its	obligations	to	the	organization.	Were	this	to	happen	in	the	
 
173	Shanghai	Statistics	Bureau,	“2010	Status	and	Characteristics	of	Shanghai	foreign	workers,”	Shanghai	sixth	
national	census	data	analysis,	archived,	https://web.archive.org/web/20150920212411/http://www.stats-
sh.gov.cn/fxbg/201112/237137.html.	
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China-Taiwan	sphere,	China	could	force	Taiwan	into	agreements	that	it	has	no	choice	but	to	
follow,	which	could	further	erode	any	form	of	sovereignty	they	struggle	to	hold	on	to.	This	
could	be	Taiwan’s	future	as	China	moves	toward	an	informal	“one	country,	two	systems”	
with	the	heavier	emphasis	on	economic	integration.	
Where	Taiwan	differs	greatly	from	Hong	Kong,	however,	is	the	manner	in	which	
Taiwan-China	economic	relations	have	grown,	and	what	may	be	holding	them	back.	In	the	
1990s,	Taiwan	experienced	growth	in	two	areas.	From	the	start	of	the	decade,	they	began	
opening	to	Chinese	capital,	starting	the	process	which	has	led	Taiwan	to	where	they	are	
today.	The	other	area	was	in	politics.	Though	the	1990s	saw	the	first	direct	elections,	with	
the	Legislative	Yuan	and	Executive	Yuan	in	1991	and	1992,	followed	by	the	presidential	
election	in	1996,	calls	for	democracy	and	a	break	from	the	KMT	ideology	had	persisted	for	
years,	with	the	DPP’s	founding	in	1986.	For	three	decades	now,	the	people	of	Taiwan	have	
enjoyed	a	successful	democracy,	with	a	functioning	multi-party	system.	An	entire	
generation	of	people	have	grown	up	in	Taiwan	knowing	nothing	but	democracy	and	a	
democratic	political	culture.	As	we	have	seen	in	Hong	Kong,	the	Hong	Kongese	do	not	have	
full	control	over	their	government.	Ultimately,	it	seems,	the	PRC	wields	more	power	than	
the	Basic	Law	suggested	they	would.	Under	“one	country,	two	systems,”	the	liberal	
democracy	present	in	Taiwan	would	likely	be	put	under	heavy	constraints.	This	is	where	
the	model	would	likely	fail,	due	to	how	domestic	sovereignty	has	evolved	in	Taiwan	and	
how	democracy	has	spread	into	the	base	consciousness	of	the	Taiwanese	people.	
Though	the	PRC	is	the	clear	economic	heavyweight	in	the	relationship	with	Taiwan,	
the	democratic	political	culture	that	has	existed	for	decades	could	make	it	more	difficult	for	
the	PRC	to	take	control	under	the	“one	country,	two	systems”	model.	Though	the	
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Taiwanese	government	has	in	the	past	only	reacted	to	trends,	like	the	opening	to	Chinese	
investment	in	the	1990s,	or	only	acted	as	a	last	resort,	as	they	did	with	the	signing	of	the	
ECFA,	negotiations	for	the	implementation	of	a	model	which	would	allow	for	the	erosion	of	
democracy	in	their	region	could	push	it	too	far.	The	generation	which	has	grown	up	
knowing	only	democracy	is	now	entering	politics.	Across	the	party	system,	from	new	DPP	
members	to	new	KMT	members,	Taiwan	is	reconsidering	unification,	and	the	idea	of	a	“one	
China.”	Though	the	PRC’s	economic	gravity	may	be	too	much	for	Taiwan	to	completely	
resist	unification	over	the	long	term,	their	ties	to	democracy	and	freedom	would	likely	
prevent	a	system	like	Hong	Kong	from	being	implemented	in	Taiwan.		
Taiwan	seems	to	be	well	aware	of	this,	too.	Though	President	Tsai’s	efforts	to	
diversify	Taiwan’s	economy	may	only	serve	to	further	push	them	in	the	direction	of	
becoming	“the	next	Hong	Kong,”	it	could	easily	serve	to	save	them	from	that	fate	by	
reducing	the	economic	weight	of	the	PRC	in	the	Taiwanese	economy.	If	Tsai,	and	whoever	
her	successors	are,	continue	on	this	path,	and	increase	reliance	on	the	various	countries	of	
the	South	China	Sea,	the	PRC	will	not	be	able	to	exercise	economic	power	in	service	of	
forcing	the	model.	
Hong	Kong	did	not	have	a	democratic	political	culture	during	unification,	and	still	
today	they	do	not	entirely.	Though	there	are	pro-democracy	protests,	like	the	Umbrella	
Movement	in	2014,	and	the	newer	pro-independent	judiciary	protests	which	began	in	
2019,	the	lack	of	democracy	in	Hong	Kong’s	history	prevented	any	proper	development	of	a	
system	which	would	have	better	protected	its	citizens	in	a	post-retrocession	time.	Before	
the	PRC,	there	was	the	British	Empire,	and	before	the	British	Empire,	it	was	the	Qing	
Empire.	The	only	moment	when	democracy	seemed	hopeful	was	in	the	last	years	of	the	
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administration	of	the	last	Hong	Kong	governor.	Despite	Patten’s	best	efforts,	though,	the	
PRC	was	able	to	prevent	democracy	from	being	properly	established,	which	allowed	for	a	
smoother	transition	of	power	and	implementation	of	“one	country,	two	systems.”	
Sovereignty	tends	to	define	states	in	the	international	community,	particularly	
domestic	sovereignty	and	international	legal	sovereignty.		The	problem	with	defining	
states	in	this	way,	however,	is	when	other	groups,	not	identified	as	states	or	not	able	to	
become	states,	also	hold	these	forms	of	sovereignty.	In	Hong	Kong,	the	“one	country,	two	
systems”	model	preserved	the	powerful	economy	that	the	region	had	enjoyed	under	British	
control.	The	effect	of	this	economic	control	allowed	Hong	Kong	to	maintain	a	degree	of	
international	recognition	and	a	partial	representative	government.	The	economic	power	
provided	leverage	for	a	region	which	could	have	otherwise	lost	all	aspects	of	sovereignty.	
Taiwan’s	rejection	of	“one	country,	two	systems”	was,	in	part,	likely	based	on	the	fear	of	not	
having	that	leverage.	Though	Taiwan’s	economy	is	by	no	means	small	or	insignificant,	
Taiwan’s	lack	of	recognition	in	the	international	world,	the	fact	that	their	economy	is	
deeply	entangled	with	China’s	economy,	and	China’s	informal	ban	on	other	countries	
trading	with	Taiwan	have	hurt	Taiwan’s	chances	to	flex	any	of	their	economic	power.	In	a	
broader	sense,	the	strong	economy	can	enable	the	smaller	party	to	resist,	on	some	level,	the	
integrated	sovereignty.	When	the	smaller	party	is	incapable	of	leveraging	this	economic	
power,	“one	country,	two	systems,”	and	potentially	other	forms	of	integration,	may	lead	to	
forced	hybrid/integrated	sovereignty.	The	significance	of	the	implementation	of	“one	
country,	two	systems”	in	Hong	Kong,	as	well	as	the	rejection	of	it	by	Taiwan,	is	that	it	tells	
us	that	we	should	reconsider	the	way	we	view	and	analyze	sovereignty,	and	particularly	
the	way	we	factor	it	into	analyzing	if	a	state	is	a	state.	In	a	world	where	unrecognized	states	
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and	special	economic	zones	have	defining	features	of	states	recognized	in	the	global	
community,	sovereignty	can	no	longer	stand	as	one	of	those	defining	features,	which	also	
leads	us	to	question	what,	if	not	these	aspects	of	sovereignty,	defines	a	state.	
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